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 Abstract 
This report investigates the feasibility of a standoff interrogation method to identify 
nitrogen-rich explosive samples shielded by other materials (“clutter”) using neutron beams from 
252Cf and deuterium-tritium (D-T) generator sources. Neutrons from the beams interact with 
materials in the target to produce inelastic-scatter gamma rays, and, after slowing down to 
thermal energies, prompt-capture gamma rays. By detection of these gamma rays, a response 
vector is formed that is used to calculate a figure-of-merit, whose value is dependent upon the 
contents of the target. Various target configurations, which include an inert-material shield and a 
sample that may or may not be explosive, were simulated using the MCNP5 code. Both shielding 
and collimation of 14.1-MeV neutron beams were simulated to produce effective neutron beams 
for target interrogation purposes and to minimize dose levels. Templates corresponding to 
particular target scenarios were generated, and their effectiveness at nitrogen-rich explosive 
identification was explored. Furthermore, methods were proposed yielding more effective 
templates including grouping target responses by density and composition. The results indicate 
that neutron-based interrogation has potential to detect shielded nitrogen-rich explosives. The 
research found that using a tiered filter approach, in which a sample must satisfy several template 
requirements, achieved the best results for identifying the explosive cyclonite (RDX). A study in 
which a 14.1-MeV neutron beam irradiated a target containing a shielded sample, which could 
either be explosive (RDX) or inert, yielded no false negatives and only 2 false positives over a 
large parameter space of clutter-sample combinations. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Definitions of IEs and IEDs 
Throughout history, attempts have been made to cause destruction through the release of 
energy.  One device that achieves this malicious goal is the IED, the Improvised Explosive 
Device, based on IEs or Improvised Explosives. IEs are, “compounds or mixtures of compounds, 
which have explosive properties and should be relatively easily prepared by laymen under simple 
conditions (home made) using freely available chemicals and information” (Schubert, 2006).  
Next, IED’s are defined as, “explosive charges with IE-material in confined or unconfined shape, 
equipped with commercial or improvised initiators” (Schubert, 2006). An alternative definition 
of an IED is, “a device placed or fabricated in an improvising manner incorporating destructive, 
lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, 
harass or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary 
components” (Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, 2008). 
1.2 Brief History and Description of the IED Problem 
Explosives have been used for hundreds of years but IEDs employed in numerous 
amounts first occurred in World War II. After being introduced, IEDs have been a constituent of 
almost every major conflict since then, including Vietnam, Northern Ireland, and the war with 
Afghanistan, and they have a strong presence in the current war with Iraq through the Al Quaeda 
and Coalition Forces (Marolda, 2003; Sigaltchik, 1970; Iraq Coalition Causality Count, 2008). In 
the last decade, the audacity of acts of terrorism has dramatically increased across the world, as 
the attack on the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001 indicates. During the months May to 
August 2007 in Iraq, there were more than 250 recorded fatalities from IEDs (Iraq Coalition 
Causality Count, 2008). Terrorists, who employ almost any type of destructive technology, 
particularly favor the IED for its versatility and destructive power. Thus, an urgent need exists 
for a type of technology that will detect IEDs effectively in many scenarios to decrease their 
destruction in both war and acts of terror. Currently, no comprehensive solution to the problem 
exists, particularly in regards to IED identification in bulk or cargo containers (Runkle, et al. 
2009). 
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Many lives have been altered because of IEDS with total casualties for the year 2007, 
over many world regions (see Figure 1.1), of 5,426 documented, of which 71% were civilians 
(Mines Action Canada, 2008). The country with the most casualties from IEDs during 2007 was 
Columbia. However, IEDs have spread to most regions of the world and will most likely 
continue to spread as technology increases and world trade expands. Additionally, even if the 
number of IEDs does not increase dramatically in the future, thousands of IEDs and mines 
remain buried in fields from previous wars with ominous potential. By their nature, numerous 
types of IEDs exist, a fact that adds to the complexity of the detection process. Also, IEDs may 
vary in composition, design, and placement or concealment. 
 
Figure 1.1 IED casualties in 2006 and 2007 in several countries (Mines Action Canada, 
2008). 
1.2.1 Explosives Utilized in IEDs 
Many different types of explosives are used in IED fabrication, but they can be grouped 
into three main classes. One of the most common classes of explosives utilized in IEDs is 
military explosives, consisting of standard military explosives or mixtures of standard military 
explosive compounds. Examples of such compounds include TNT, PETN, RDX, HMX, NG, NC 
and others (Mostak and Stancl, 2006). Additionally, demilitarized explosives are often 
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employed. These are a subclass of military explosives and consist of a similar chemical 
composition to military explosives, however, in a dismantled or processed form. A second class 
is industrial explosives, which are used for mine blasting or other projects needing demolition 
capabilities. Examples of these types of explosives are primarily dynamites, ammonites, ANFO, 
slurries, emulsions and black powder (Mostak and Stancl, 2006). Finally, purely improvised 
explosives are a third category. These types of substances, in principle, have no limitations other 
than that they are inherently chemically unstable and possess the potential for the release of 
exothermic energy. Examples of such substances are organic peroxides and ammonium nitrates – 
fuel, oil sugar mixtures etc. (Mostak and Stancl, 2006). Because of a lack of group structure, 
when purely improvised explosives are used to make IEDs, they often prove the most difficult to 
detect. However, IEs and IEDs are often limited to the first two classes to maintain sufficiently 
volatile destruction capability, which will be further explained in chapter 3. 
1.2.2 Design of IEDs 
As IEDs are improvised by nature, no limitations on their design exist. The essential 
components consist of a volatile material coupled with a detonator. Generally, their creators seek 
a material with the most destructive potential to maximize damage. However, IEDs are often 
composed of whatever explosive material is readily available. Often pipe bombs will be used in 
the design of IEDs or other normal compact containers. Just as the IED is often shrewdly 
improvised, the detonation procedure follows analogously; detonation methods include timed 
detonation, pressure detonation, remote frequency (cell phones or garage door openers) and 
manual triggering through a direct wire (Schubert, 2006).  IEDs may be designed for 
antipersonnel use, involving small charges and mines, or they may be devised to destroy 
vehicles, such as ambushing military convoys. As an example, an artillery shell IED is shown in 
Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2 Common artillery shell IED design (Inert Explosive Training Products, 2009).  
It is also necessary to parameterize the shapes of explosives. IEDs may be very diverse in 
shape, most commonly existing as sphere, sheet, cylindrical or rectangular shapes. Primarily, 
sheet explosives are defined as thin explosives spread over a large area, whereas bulk explosives 
are more compact explosive volumes including spheres, boxes, or cylinders and other 
compressed shapes. Generally, sheet explosives are less dangerous than bulk explosives, due to 
their large surface area to volume ratio when compared to bulk explosives which typically 
creates less pressure during explosions. Therefore, bulk explosives were focused in this report. 
1.2.3 Placement of IEDs 
As mentioned, IEDs are often cleverly hidden in safe-looking objects including fire 
extinguishers, briefcases, mail packages and other apparently benign devices (Schubert, 2006; 
Wilson, 2006). Placement of the IED usually depends on its size and the designer’s intent for 
use. Often IEDs are buried or deployed in car trunks. Vehicle born IEDs (VBIED) generally 
contain large volumes of bulk explosives rather than simple mines and buried artillery shells. For 
more effect, often IEDs are coupled or “daisy chained,” used in shape charges, or staged in a 
multilevel ambush on roadways to trap military convoys (Wilson, 2006). Such tactics optimize 
the destructive power of the IED and are popular choices for many terrorists. Additionally, IEDs 
may be surrounded by dangerous shrapnel materials, such as nails or small metal parts, causing 
debilitating fragments to be ejected during an explosion. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Explosive Detection Techniques 
When dealing with IED threats, three common tactics exist for minimizing the threat: 
prevention, shielding and detection. IED prevention and shielding, though also important defense 
mechanisms, are not the subject of this thesis, and they will not be considered. Because of the 
gravity of the threat posed by IEDs in terrorism and warfare, development of an effective 
detection technique is critical. In general, methods exist for identifying hidden materials, such as 
explosives and contraband, but identification is a complex and multi-faceted task. Because of the 
difficulty of the problem and the variety of explosives used, many unique detection techniques 
have been proposed (see Figure 2.1) and vary in their effectiveness. Before a discussion of 
detection techniques, it is first important to define the term signature in relation to explosive 
detection.  
• Signature - Any characteristic that may be consistently used to differentiate 
explosive targets from non-explosive or inert targets. 
Detection of IEDs may be divided into three groups: non-explosive component detection, trace 
detection and bulk detection. Non-explosive component detection involves detecting IED parts 
that are not explosive by nature, for example detonators, shell casing, and unique circuitry. 
Because detection of non-explosive components of IEDs is not a widely used method due to a 
high false alarm rate and other problems, it will not be discussed. Secondly, trace detection 
methods involve seeking microscopic traces, including vapors or small pieces of evidence 
revealing the presence of an explosive device. Finally, bulk detection methods attempt to detect 
the macroscopic properties of the explosive device directly, often through imaging or scanning 
methods as shown in Figure 2.1. The following sections describe specific explosive detection 
methods in current literature. 
2.1 Trace Detection Methods 
Trace detection, differing from bulk detection, relies on one of two often difficult to 
detect signatures: explosive vapor and explosive particulate.  
• Explosive Vapor - gas-phase molecules emitted from the surface of the explosive 
when the atmospheric pressure is higher than the vapor pressure of the explosive. 
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• Explosive Particulate - microscopic explosive particles that adhere to any 
surface that has been in direct or indirect contact with the explosive. 
Thus, trace detection methods rely on collection of either of these types of evidence obtained 
from the explosive sample. Generally speaking, vapor pressures for common explosives as 
shown in Table 2.1 are known to be small, which makes accurate detection by vapor difficult 
because of reduced detection efficiency. Air currents are also a detriment to vapor detection 
systems, limiting their effectiveness in a drafty field environment.  
Table 2.1 Vapor pressure for common explosives (Sanchez, et al. 2007). 
Explosive             Class      Vapor Pressure (Torr) at 293K 
RDX   Nitramine   5 x 10-9
HMX   Nitramine   8 x 10-11 
TETRYL  Nitramine   6 x 10-6
TNG   Nitrate Ester   4 x 10-4
PETN   Nitrate Ester   1 x 10-8
TNT   Nitroaromatic   7 x 10-6
 
Next, effective particulate detection requires collecting explosive particles. Typically, 
contact is required with either the explosive surface or something that has come into contact with 
the explosive; however, this is often not possible. To prevent detection, frequently intentional 
concealment restricts the vapor and particulates from escaping the explosive container, making 
detection even more challenging. Fortunately, explosive contaminants are normally difficult to 
contain completely. Despite the challenges, many trace explosive detection techniques have been 
investigated and perform satisfactorily in some scenarios. 
2.1.1 Electronic or Chemical 
Chemiluminescence (CL) – This method of explosive detection uses chemical reactions that 
produce energy in the form of light, including ultraviolet, visible or infrared (Jimenez and Navas, 
2007). In principle, ultraviolet and infrared light can be used for detection; however, observation 
of visible light (about 400-700 nm wavelength) is most common. Specifically, CL can be used to 
detect explosives by identifying the reaction of nitric oxide and the ozone:  
 NO + O3 → NO2* + O2  and  NO2* → NO2 + light  (IR),           (2.1) 
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which occurs in nitrogen-rich explosives (Jimenez and Navas, 2004). However, the effectiveness 
of CL in detection of IEDs is limited. For example, it is primarily restricted to detecting nitrogen-
rich explosives and is not selective when identifying the type of explosive (Jimenez and Navas, 
2007).  
Mass Spectrometry – This method analyzes a substance in relation to the masses of its 
corresponding atoms. Two primary methods exist for separation and analysis using mass 
spectrometry: a method based on time separation and a method based on geometric separation 
(Yinon, 2007). In general, mass spectrometry detects residual traces of explosives in 
contamination of air, dust etc. Often triple quadrupole mass spectrometers are necessary to 
monitor mass ratios in reactions by recording data through selected reaction monitoring (SRM). 
Disadvantages with the method include a minimum trace detection mass of at least 100 pg for 
TNT, NG, PETN and RDX (Yinon, 2007). Other disadvantages include high expenses, the need 
for advanced equipment, and lack of portability.  
2.1.2 Optical 
Infrared (IR) Spectroscopy - Because molecules absorb light at characteristic wavelengths, 
identifying chemical composition by examining an absorption spectrum is possible. Indeed, IR 
spectroscopy has been used to find the absorption spectrum from explosive particulates and 
explosive vapor for detection (Steinfeld and Wormhoudt, 1998). Cavity-ringdown spectroscopy, 
which uses mid-infrared light, also has been applied for explosive vapor detection. With this 
method, limits of 75 ppt for TNT and other explosives have been found, which allows for lower 
limits of detection than many vapor methods (Todd, et al. 2002). 
Microcantilevers – Microcantilever detection is a trace detection method that detects 
particulates using a cantilever, a beam supported only on one end. In basic microcantilever 
detection, absorption of molecules on the unsupported side of the cantilever causes bending, 
which may be monitored with high sensitivity (Senesac and Thundat, 2007). Microcantilevers 
have the potential for detection because of their miniature size, array detection capabilities, high 
sensitivity and low power consumption (Van Neste, et al. 2008). Additionally, microcantilever 
explosive detection coupled with photothermal deflection spectroscopy is possible by observing 
the bend in the microcantilever after absorption of infrared light.  
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Figure 2.1  Common explosive detection technologies used currently for (a) bulk and (b) 
trace detection techniques. 
2.1.3 Biosensors 
Interestingly, it is possible to detect explosives with biosensors. Many biological systems 
are capable of acting as biosensors including canines, pigs, rats, bees, and microorganisms 
(Harper and Furton, 2007). Biosensors usually use the sense of smell or olfaction for explosive 
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detection. Notably, canine detection remains one of the most popular of these methods, mostly 
because the olfactory abilities of many dogs are exceptional and because dogs are easily trained. 
Highly sensitive breeds have approximately 1000 times the olfaction ability of a human. They 
may possess 220 million olfactory receptors compared to 5 million olfactory receptors in a 
human (Correa, 2005). Furthermore, the training and deployment of canines for explosive 
detection has been shown to be effective, and over 800 canine teams are in use by U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection with Homeland Security. Mimicking this capability, microsensors with 
gas chromatography (GC) called ‘electronic noses’ have been used as explosive detectors 
simulating olfaction, but they achieve less selectivity than canines. Bees, which have been 
studied as potential biological detector systems, have been found to detect explosive odor 
concentrations below most microsensors and possess an ability comparable to canines. 
Limitations of biosensors include expensive training, non-continuous operation and sometimes 
brief operation time, limited by the life-time of the animal.  
2.2 Bulk Detection Methods 
Given that bulk explosive detection consists of identifying the macroscopic 
characteristics of explosives, these methods detect explosives with electromagnetic and particle 
radiation. Currently, explored methods may implement microwave, photon, and neutron 
techniques. As the radiation must be probing, other types of radiation such as charged particles 
are ineffective because they cannot adequately penetrate clutter or soil materials. For example, 
alpha particle radiation cannot even penetrate a sheet of paper and thus is inadequate for shielded 
IEDs. Primarily, bulk detection methods use three signatures: shape of the IED, density of the 
IED and composition of the IED. Probing radiation used in bulk detection offers several potential 
advantages over many trace detection techniques for larger targets, including the following.  
• Greater Specificity – Fewer false positives or non-explosives are labeled as 
explosives. 
• Penetrability – It offers the ability to interrogate larger volumes. 
• Sensitivity – It has fewer false negatives or explosives labeled as non-explosives. 
• Quick Interrogation – It offers high intensity that allows rapid scanning. 
• Standoff Interrogation – Detection from a distance improves operator and 
equipment safety. 
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A challenge to bulk detection techniques is sheet-shaped explosives. A cone-shaped beam of 
radiation will generally interact weakly with thin sheet explosives, because it passes through only 
a minimal amount of explosive material. Fortunately, as mentioned, they are generally less 
dangerous than bulk explosives. Several bulk explosive detection techniques are described next. 
2.2.1 X-ray/Photon Interrogation 
X-ray Transmission – X-ray interrogation provides information primarily about target density. 
X-ray transmission can be used to form a compound image that varies with the absorption of X 
rays in materials, which depends on their density and to a small extent on their atomic number. 
Some or all of the transmitted X rays are then absorbed by a detector, and an image is created. 
Transmission technology is advanced and is in effect in many airport screening scenarios (Singh, 
2003).  However, many false positives occur, and the method is not suited to standoff detection. 
Because explosives may be in any shape, imaging methods do not work well in large cargo 
volumes containing many diversely shaped types of materials. In small volumes, such as 
suitcases and small baggage, however, imaging technology is very effective. Additionally, X 
rays may detect other explosive components including wiring or supplementary mechanisms.  
Backscattered X rays – Backscattered X rays can also be used to form radiographs and allow 
standoff detection. Because of the characteristics of backscattered radiography, it is particularly 
effective in discriminating against low atomic number and larger than average density materials, 
such as plastic explosives (Singh, 2003). However, false alarms and explosive shielding is a 
significant problem with this technique. 
Computed Tomography (CT) - CT is an imaging method employing tomography, which 
allows two-dimensional images to be constructed, having excellent spatial resolution. However, 
it requires extensive scanning around all or portions of a target. Several methods exist including 
direct X-ray transmission imaging, coded X-ray scatter imaging, coherent scatter X-ray CT 
(Harding, 2004), and dual-energy CT. However, the method is ill-suited to standoff detection, 
because it requires extensive multi-angle scanning and position-sensitive detectors or detector 
arrays. Additionally, for all X-ray techniques, interpretation is typically required by a user or 
complex software algorithms, rendering the detection system user intensive or otherwise 
complex. 
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2.2.2 Electromagnetic Imaging Methods 
Resonant Infrared Photothermal Imaging – This imaging method aims an infrared (IR) laser 
at a suspect surface and then views the surface through a photothermal imager. Resonant 
absorption occurs in the explosive particulates at specific IR wavelengths, which is observed 
using the thermal contrast. This method distinguishes trace explosives with particles as small as 
10 μm (Furstenberg, et al. 2008), and is a trace detection method. 
Microwave and Millimeter-wave – The use of electromagnetic waves with frequencies in the 
gigahertz range is valid because this method is a low dose exposure detection method able to 
penetrate some targets. Microwave and millimeter-wave scanning allow imaging of a target with 
larger wavelength frequencies generally producing higher resolution images. Microwave 
scanning may be used for interrogating people and can penetrate clothing. It can operate at 
standoff distances of 1 m or greater and requires simple, relatively inexpensive scanning 
equipment (Kuznetsov and Evsenin, 2006). Millimeter waves from 30-300 GHz behave similarly 
to microwaves for detection purposes. Both frequency ranges can produce images that can be 
used to identify some explosives (Sheen, et al. 2007). Disadvantages include strong wave 
attenuation through dense materials causing low penetrability in thick clutter materials. This 
allows explosives to be concealed. Ultimately, microwave and millimeter-wave scanning is a 
technique best suited for interrogating people rather than for volume interrogation. 
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) – Nuclear quadrupole resonance uses magnetic 
resonance physics similar to the physics in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). It operates on the 
principle that a quadrupole nucleus will align its spin with an electrostatic field. When a specific 
electric field gradient is applied, the nucleus will flip its electric quadrupole moment, generating 
a NQR pulse (Garroway, et al. 2001). Thus, NQR permits magnetic resonance without a magnet 
present. This differs from NMR, which requires a static homogenous magnetic field (Miller, 
2007). In particular, NQR has been used to detect plastic explosives containing RDX, PETN, 
HMX and others (Rudakov, et al. 2006). Also, NQR has been proposed for vehicle screening; 
however, it is difficult to generate an RF magnetic field of sufficient magnitude for operation in a 
field environment. NQR also requires close proximity for detection purposes and thus is not a 
good standoff technique. 
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2.2.3 Neutron Interrogation Techniques 
As will be further explained, most explosives contain similar compositions of hydrogen 
(H), carbon (C), nitrogen (N) and oxygen (O). Based on this similarity, neutron interrogation 
methods enable explosive identification from the stoichiometry of a target. Neutrons, because of 
their charge-less nature, offer a unique method to identify a compounds’ composition. Neutrons 
are not governed by Coulomb’s law and interact with nuclei. In one reaction, neutrons interact 
with the nuclei of the elements irradiated, generating gamma rays through inelastic scattering. 
Inelastic scattering is an energy de-excitation phenomenon that deals with energy level 
transitions within nuclei and is explained further in chapter 3. All nuclei possess excited states of 
higher quantized energy levels, which can be predicted by nuclear physics. This has been 
experimentally demonstrated, for example, through scattering energetic protons of known 
momentum off nuclei from an element of interest and measuring the scatter angles and final 
momenta of the protons. However, excited states of nuclei are not stable, and decay most 
prominently through gamma emission, the gamma rays having discrete energies characteristic of 
the changes in energy states. Each element may be identified by its specific set of inelastic-
scatter gamma-ray energies, produced by high-energy neutrons. Frequently, many of these 
gamma-ray energies are not shared by other commonly existing elements in nature, making them 
distinct. Therefore characterization of neutron irradiated explosives is possible for explosives 
containing H, C, N, and O, by detection of gamma rays of the specific gamma-ray energies 
emitted from those elements. Thus, neutron interrogation presents signatures for identifying the 
composition of an explosive target. It remains to be determined which bulk method may be most 
useful for this type of detection. While X-ray and other bulk imaging methods are useful, as 
described, an IED is not limited to a specific shape. This limits the potential for detection based 
on imaging. Therefore, explosive shape when used as a signature is useful but not unique. 
Additionally, transmitted and scattered X-ray intensities are primarily affected by density and 
only minimally affected by composition. Thus, neutrons offer the following distinct advantages 
over many other bulk explosive detection methods.  
• Stoichiometric Identification – Energy signatures may be used to identify the elemental 
composition, not only the density and approximate atomic number, as in X-ray methods.  
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• Greater Penetrability – While X rays do have good penetration in low Z materials, 
high-energy neutrons penetrate low and high Z materials such as iron, reducing the 
shielding effects of explosive shielding (see Table 2.2).  
A challenge of neutron techniques is that they are inadequate for screening people because of the 
dose delivered. However, in screening cargo or other inert targets, they are useful as long as 
activation is kept to acceptable levels. Predominant neutron interrogation methods are 
summarized in the following paragraphs. 
Table 2.2  Material thicknesses needed to attenuate both neutron and photon beams to 
0.1% of the incident flux (Runkle, 2009). 
 Attenuation Length (cm)   
Photon Beam Semtex-H Machine Parts Magazines Electronics 
200 keV 35 5.1 62 120 
1.2/1.3 MeV (60Co) 81 17 140 516 
2 MeV brems. 64 13 113 430 
6 MeV brems. 110 21 200 680 
Neutron Beam     
Thermal 6.3 5.4 5.8 5.7 
D-D (2.45 MeV) 52 24 54 340 
D-T (14.1 MeV) 110 53 170 1000 
 
Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) – One of the first neutron interrogation techniques was 
TNA. This technique, which uses thermal neutrons with a most probable energy of 
approximately 0.0253 eV at room temperature, involves absorption of the neutron in the (n, γ) 
reaction. Both prompt and delayed gamma rays emitted from the reaction may be measured. One 
reason TNA has often been preferred is because the cross sections for thermal neutron absorption 
are much higher than for fast neutrons (Buffler, 2004; Hussein and Waller, 1998; Lanza, 2007). 
A drawback of TNA is that it is difficult to manufacture a portable intense source of thermal 
neutrons. A common source of thermal neutrons is reactor beam ports. 
Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA) – In this method, gamma rays are detected after emission from a 
target isotope following (n, n’γ) reactions (Hussein and Waller, 1998; Lanza, 2007). Because fast 
neutrons are readily available in isotope or generator sources, this is a practical method. 
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Additionally, fast neutrons are attenuated less in an object than thermal neutrons, permitting 
better neutron imaging. FNA seeks the inelastic-scatter gamma rays generated from fast neutron 
interrogation of elements H, C, N, and O. Usually a detector with high resolution and good 
efficiency, such as a high purity germanium (HPGe) detector, is used with the technique.  
Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA) – Similar to FNA, PFNA uses fast neutrons in the (n, 
n’γ) reaction to generate inelastic-scatter gamma rays, but the neutrons are emitted in multiple 
nanosecond pulses (Lanza, 2007).  Detection methods are similar to FNA, and HPGe detectors 
are often used. The method may also identify the location of the inelastic-scatter gamma-ray 
emission voxel from a comparison of neutron generation and gamma-ray emission timing.  
Pulsed Fast and Thermal Neutron Analysis (PFTNA) – In this method of scanning, the target 
is interrogated with alternating pulsed fast and thermal neutron beams to identify its composition. 
The reactions (n,n’γ), (n,p γ) and (n,γ) are used to identify the elemental composition 
(Vourvopoulos and Womble, 2001). The method has the advantage of being portable and being 
able to measure neutron information like TNA, but it is also able to measure fast neutron 
reactions, yielding more information than TNA and PFNA. It does have a slower, 10-ms pulse 
time versus a 2-ns pulse time capable in PFNA (Singh, 2003). Often, the source of the neutron 
beam is a neutron generator, either utilizing the reaction involving deuterium-deuterium (D-D) or 
the reaction of deuterium-tritium (D-T) for neutron generation. 
Nanosecond Neutron Analysis/ Associated Particles Technique (NNA/APT) – In this 
method, inelastic-scatter gamma rays are measured following fast D-T neutron interrogation 
(Lanza, 2007; Tourneur, 2007). The D(T,α)n reaction produces an alpha particle emitted in the 
direction opposite to that of the neutron. Detection of the alpha (associated particle) can be used 
to determine the time and, if position sensitive detectors are used, the direction of the emitted 
neutron (Buffler, 2004). Gamma-ray detection is often achieved through use of NaI or BGO 
detectors. The alpha particle is detected at the time of neutron generation, and the neutron is time 
tagged. This allows for imaging of a target based on the time the gamma ray is received, which 
indicates the depth in the target at which the gamma ray was emitted.  
2.3 Neutron Generator Sources 
 Neutron generator techniques have in the past been tried and not implemented, due to 
several discouraging factors (Hussein and Waller, 1998; Lacey, 2007). Previously, neutron 
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generators were difficult to obtain, operate and afford. Secondly, the technology was premature 
and needed refining. Also, past neutron generators were large and had short operation lifetimes. 
Finally, properly shielding a high energy portable neutron source is a challenging task to 
maintain the safety of both operators and bystanders.  
While the latter problems are not trivial, they are not insurmountable because commercial 
neutron generator technology has evolved considerably. Additionally, as described, no current 
method of detection has the penetration and potential of neutrons for interrogation of bulk targets 
and shielded explosives. Therefore, it is worthy of investigation. Currently, commercial neutron 
generators are rising in availability. The technology has a much longer operation lifetime and 
some models operate with a much higher flux than previously possible, approaching 1010 n s-1 or 
higher (Yoshikawa, et al. 2007; Adelphi, 2005). This will allow for more rapid and deeper 
probing interrogation. Not only are current neutron generators powerful, but they are also 
compact, sometimes as small as a few cubic feet in size (see Figure 2.2), and portable.  
 
Figure 2.2  Adelphi’s compact RF-plasma D-D 2.5-MeV neutron generator, capable of 
emitting 1010 n s-1 (Adelphi, 2005). 
Two main types of neutron generators currently exist. Using the 2H(d,n) 3He reaction,  
neutrons may be generated at an energy of 2.5 MeV with a D-D generator. Secondly, 14.1-MeV 
neutrons are produced with the 2H(t,n)4He reaction with a D-T generator. Because they may be 
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pulsed instead of used continuously, adequate shielding is achievable if properly designed, 
allowing operation in an urban environment. As mentioned, neutrons are not suited to human 
interrogation, but bulk target scanning is a feasible application. A hybrid approach is suggested 
by Runkle, in which a combination of neutrons producing gamma rays coupled with neutron 
counters and photon methods may be an effective approach. Finally, costly equipment is an 
unavoidable problem with all techniques for bulk detection (Runkle, et al. 2009). 
2.4 IED Checking Systems 
Two main types of IED detection systems are commonly in use: stationary systems and 
mobile systems. Stationary systems are only capable of interrogation at fixed locations, while 
mobile systems may be transported. Each type may operate either close to a target (operator and 
equipment), remotely (in which equipment is near the target but the operator is not) or as a 
standoff detection system (in which both operator and equipment are a distance from the target). 
Standoff systems are generally considered to be one-sided systems, in which all of the detection 
and scanning equipment is on the same side of the target. Some scenarios, such as airport or 
fixed explosive checkpoint stations, use stationary systems and may use standoff or remote 
detection. One such system using remote detection uses a D-T neutron generator coupled with 
HPGe detectors and is capable of vehicle scanning for IEDs (Koltick, et al. 2007). The system 
also has a GUI in place, which facilitates effective equipment operation. While this method may 
work for a checkpoint station, it does not function as a standoff technology, and it is large and 
costly. Another important part of an explosive interrogation system is the level of automation. 
Detection systems requiring extensive technical expertise to operate are not feasible for general 
use. Ideally, an optimal explosive detection system for a field environment would be feasible to 
produce, mobile, operable at standoff, and highly automated, requiring minimal user inputs. 
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2.5 Goal Statement and Research Summary 
The explosive detection approach suggested in this thesis would operate with a portable 
D-T neutron generator, using fast and thermal neutron analysis for interrogation in eventual 
symbiosis with a photon interrogation method and neutron detectors. The research applies a 
signature-based radiation scanning (SBRS) approach that incorporates figures-of-merit. The 
thesis only investigates the neutron-induced gamma-ray portion of SBRS through simulations.  
The objective of the research contained in the thesis was twofold. The first objective was 
to simulate shielding and collimation to produce appropriate neutron beams for interrogation 
purposes in a field environment from a 14.1-MeV isotropic point neutron source. Both a beam 
collimating source vault and a beam catcher were designed within this research. 
The second and primary objective was to establish some bounds on how well beams of 
neutrons can be used to distinguish, at stand-off distances of up to a few meters, nitrogen-rich 
explosive materials from inert materials when these materials are hidden within small targets. 
The use of parallel neutron beams from californium-252 (252Cf) and 14.1-MeV neutron 
generators was investigated for the utility of explosive identification using a template-matching 
technique. Simulations involved a variety of explosive and inert materials in various target 
configurations. The primary tool used was Monte Carlo simulation with the MCNP5 code. The 
use of neutron induced gamma-ray responses from the elements H, C, N and O for explosive 
detection was explored through simulations. An attempt was made to find the optimum prompt-
capture and inelastic-scatter characteristic gamma-ray signature energies for nitrogen-rich 
explosive identification. A particular objective was to determine ways to minimize the effects of 
shielding materials called “clutter,” or inert materials placed around or near an explosive sample 
within a target. The potential of using “average” templates, i.e., templates made from the average 
composition of nitrogen-rich explosives, or templates that represented an average response from 
a range of explosive materials or explosive materials with inert clutter materials, was considered. 
The use of responses from “artificial templates,” or templates containing specific concentrations 
and densities of clutter materials was tested. Methods of organizing clutter materials into groups 
based on features such as density and atomic number were explored. A method that incorporated 
a tiered or multiple stage filter process was investigated. An effort was made to identify the 
minimum number of templates needed to distinguish nitrogen-rich explosives from inert targets 
in particular geometrical configurations that may incorporate clutter.   
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CHAPTER 3 - Theory 
3.1 Elements of Neutron Physics 
Although some elements of neutron physics have been explained in the previous section, 
a more in-depth explanation may be helpful. Neutrons are neutral, and they interact primarily 
with the nuclei of atoms, not with their electrons. Additionally, the nuclear forces that are 
involved in many neutron-nuclei interactions within matter interact at a very short range between 
neutrons and nucleons. Therefore, neutrons must pass near the nucleus of an atom for an 
interaction to occur. Because the size of a nucleus is small relative to the size of an atom, 
neutrons can travel considerable distances in matter. In contrast, X rays interact with electrons in 
a target. The kinetic energy of neutrons has a strong effect upon their behavior. Neutrons are 
generally divided into three groups according to their energy, consisting of thermal (< 0.2 eV), 
epithermal (0.2 eV < E < 0.1 MeV) and fast (> 0.1 MeV). Neutrons interact with matter in four 
primary ways.  
1) Neutron Capture – Occurs when a neutron is captured or absorbed by an atomic 
nucleus to form a heavier nucleus. The interaction is of the form AX(n, γ) A+1X, 
where the heavier nucleus de-excites through emission of one or more prompt, 
and in some cases delayed, gamma rays. Cross sections for neutron capture are 
high for thermal neutrons, lower for epithermal neutrons and very low for fast 
neutrons, and often are inversely proportional to E , where E is neutron energy, 
over a large neutron energy range. 
2) Nuclear Reactions – Are processes in which a neutron collides with a nucleus to 
form a new nucleus, which de-excites by emission of particles. Examples include 
reactions such as , , and . A variety of 
particles may be produced during nuclear reactions and delayed gamma rays often 
are emitted to make the nucleus energetically stable. Thermal, epithermal, and fast 
neutrons may all cause nuclear reactions.  
A A
Z Z-1X(n,p) Y
A A-1
Z ZX(n,2n) X
4
-2
A A-
Z ZX(n, ) Yα
3) Elastic Scattering – Occurs when a neutron scatters or collides with a nucleus, 
transferring some of its kinetic energy to kinetic energy of the nucleus, but not 
leaving the nucleus in an excited state. Elastic scattering conserves kinetic energy. 
The elastic scattering cross section is fairly constant with energy.  
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4) Inelastic Scattering – Is a scattering reaction that does not conserve kinetic 
energy. Instead, some of the neutron’s kinetic energy is given to the nucleus, 
exciting it. The nucleus then de-excites via emission of a inelastic-scatter gamma 
ray. The reaction is of the type X(n, n’γ)X. Only neutrons above a threshold 
energy for a particular isotope may scatter inelastically.  
3.2 Explosive Composition 
In general explosive detection, two classes of materials exist: explosives (or explosive 
surrogates), and inert (or non-explosive) materials. Inert materials may be used for explosive 
shielding. Explosives encompass a broad category of energetically or chemically unstable 
substances. As mentioned in the introduction, three fundamental groups of prevalently used 
explosives exist: military explosives, industrial explosives and other unstable compounds (often 
improvised). Additionally, explosives may be categorized by their burning rate. Primary 
explosives, also called low explosives (LE) tend to burn rapidly, or deflagrate. Secondary 
explosives, also called high explosives (HE), detonate and burn in millionths of a second. HE 
create much more pressure than LE when burning, resulting in stronger explosions. Most 
military and industrial explosives are HE, but commercially available unstable compounds may 
be of either type. Figure 3.1 shows more completely the various categories of explosive 
substances. Propellants, though dangerous, are not considered in this thesis because they are  
 
Figure 3.1  Explosive classification by substance. 
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much less dangerous than HE. Clearly, any type of explosive can be used in an act of war or 
terror, but HE are the preferred form for terrorists. 
Chemically, explosives must include both oxidizing and reducing agents. Because strong 
oxidizers are very electronegative, explosives generally contain either nitrogen, oxygen, fluorine 
or chlorine. Fluorine and chlorine are both expensive and often too unstable to use practically for 
explosive manufacturing. Thus, most current HE contain large ratios of oxygen and nitrogen 
(National Research Council, 2004). Typically, hydrogen, carbon or other light elements are the 
reducing agents present in HE. Explosives containing large percentages of nitrogen are referred 
to as nitrogen-rich explosives. These explosives use inorganic or organic nitrate or nitro 
functional groups as the oxidant. Many of these nitrogen-rich explosives contain similar 
compositions, having been found to be approximately 3% H, 20% C, 31% N, and 46% O 
(National Research Council, 2004). Additionally, densities of explosives are generally > 50%  
higher than densities of common HCNO compounds (Dunn, 2007b). Buffler (2004) 
demonstrates that the HCNO composition of explosives is much different than that of many other 
HCNO containing materials. Specifically, Buffler lists ten nitrogen-rich explosives, 5 HCNO 
containing illicit drugs and 22 common HCNO materials (Buffler, 2004). The N and O atom 
fractions for the nitrogen-rich explosives are significantly higher than the N and O atom fractions 
present in either the illicit drugs or the HCNO containing inert materials shown (Buffler, 2004). 
This suggests that nitrogen-rich explosives have characteristics that differentiate them from most 
other ordinary HCNO containing materials. Furthermore, the partial density of O in explosives is 
higher than the partial density of C. Therefore, nitrogen-rich explosives may be differentiated 
from other materials that naturally contain nitrogen (see Figure 3.2) by utilizing ratios of the 
elements C, N and O. A strong case may then be made to apply this theory to differentiate 
nitrogen-rich explosives.  
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Figure 3.2  Ratios between partial densities of oxygen and carbon with nitrogen for various 
explosive and non-explosive materials (Kuznetsov, et al. 2006). 
Within the bounds of this thesis, only nitrogen-rich explosives were considered. Thus, an 
inert material is defined as any material that is not a nitrogen-rich explosive. Therefore, it is 
important to note that while inert materials may not be intrinsically safe materials; they are, 
however, not nitrogen-rich explosives. The following section describes a method that capitalizes 
on the characteristics of nitrogen-rich explosives to differentiate them from inert materials. 
3.3 Template Matching Procedure 
Inelastic-scatter and prompt-capture gamma-ray signatures in principle can be used to 
identify nitrogen-rich explosives. Because these explosives may be distinctly categorized by their 
HCNO concentration, it is possible to develop templates using characteristic gamma-ray 
responses generated through neutron interrogation of those elements. By examining the 
excitation states for HCNO, many inelastic-scatter and prompt-capture gamma-rays have been 
identified. Table 3.1 lists 25 candidate signature energies identified for the utility of explosive 
detection. Only gamma-ray energies from interactions with significantly large cross sections are  
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Table 3.1 25 Candidate HCNO prompt-capture and inelastic-scatter signature energies 
(Group T-16, 98-2007; Molnar, 2004). 
Element Energy 
(MeV) 
Type of Reaction Thermal  
σ (barns)  
14.1-MeV 
σ (barns) 
Hydrogen 2.2232 Hydrogen prompt-capture  0.3326 - 
Carbon 1.2618 Carbon prompt-capture 0.00124 - 
 3.6839 Carbon  prompt-capture   0.00122 - 
 4.4390 Carbon inelastic-scatter - 0.2106 
 4.9453 Carbon prompt-capture  0.00261 - 
Nitrogen 0.7284 Nitrogen inelastic-scatter - 0.0206 
 1.6353 Nitrogen inelastic-scatter - 0.0228 
 1.8848 Nitrogen prompt-capture 0.01470 - 
 2.3128 Nitrogen inelastic-scatter - 0.0557 
 2.7931 Nitrogen inelastic-scatter - 0.0106 
 3.3786 Nitrogen inelastic-scatter - 0.0109 
 3.8907 Nitrogen inelastic-scatter - 0.00354 
 4.9151 Nitrogen inelastic-scatter - 0.00687 
 5.1059 Nitrogen inelastic-scatter - 0.0437 
 5.2692 Nitrogen prompt-capture 0.0236 - 
 6.4462 Nitrogen inelastic-scatter - 0.0122 
 7.0291 Nitrogen inelastic-scatter - 0.0242 
 10.8291 Nitrogen prompt-capture 0.01068575 - 
Oxygen 0.8707 Oxygen  prompt-capture  0.00019 - 
 1.0879 Oxygen  prompt-capture  0.000155 - 
 2.1845 Oxygen  prompt-capture  0.000155 - 
 2.7420 Oxygen inelastic-scatter - 0.0433 
 6.1299 Oxygen inelastic-scatter - 0.144 
 6.9171 Oxygen inelastic-scatter - 0.0317 
 7.1168 Oxygen inelastic-scatter - 0.0625 
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listed in Table 3.1. First, gamma rays emitted by H, C, N, or O with the largest prompt-capture 
cross sections were selected for each element (Molnar, 2004). Next, inelastic-scatter gamma rays 
were selected, requiring cross sections to exceed 0.003 barns from interrogation by neutrons with 
energy 14.1 MeV (Group T-16, 98-2007). An effort was made to select several prompt-capture 
and several inelastic-scatter gamma rays for each element. Chapter 5 examines the utility of the 
signature energies shown in Table 3.1 for explosive detection.  
Using the signature energies in Table 3.1 to form a predicted response from a target, it is 
possible to develop templates to represent many plausible target scenarios. A library of templates 
may be compiled based upon characteristic responses of HCNO containing nitrogen-rich 
explosives, giving rise to what is called signature-based radiation scanning (SBRS). SBRS is an 
implementation of a template matching procedure. It makes use of a template library, 
representing targets containing nitrogen-rich explosives in various geometries and in the 
presence of various clutter materials. Initially, an unknown target is interrogated with a neutron 
beam. Then, SBRS calculates figures-of-merit and their variances from an unknown target, 
which will be further described, and a template library derived from known targets. SBRS is a 
robust technique for explosive-inert differentiation. The template matching approach requires 
minimal user interaction, differentiating it from most techniques. Thus, the SBRS method offers 
much promise by providing an automated method for identifying IEDs. If this method is feasible, 
it will enable a considerable range of targets to be identified through neutron interrogation. The 
method should be field applicable for various IED containers, including briefcases, buried mines, 
vehicles and bulk cargo containers.    
3.4 Template Generation Procedure for SBRS 
It is assumed that for any given target type, a finite maximum of L templates will be able 
to represent it adequately. Let a template S  be a vector of N signatures for a target that contains 
a known explosive sample, where the subscript l  indicates a particular target configuration 
(position of sample in the target, amount and distribution of clutter, etc.) out of a total of L 
configurations, i.e.,   
l
( )1 2 , 1,2, ,NS S S L= =Sl l l lK l K .             (3.1) 
After an appropriate number of templates is generated for a specific target type, an unknown 
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target of the same type is interrogated; this results in the generation of a response vector, R. Let 
R be a vector of the same N signatures for the test target, i.e.  
( )1 2 NR R R=R K .             (3.2) 
The response vector will then be compared to the library of L templates for the corresponding 
target type using a figure-of-merit (FOM) procedure described in the next section. A computer 
code is used to calculate figures-of-merit from the vectors S and R, explained below, for 
unknown targets. Table 3.2 demonstrates a sample template with N signatures and N standard 
deviations given by 
l
σ . 
Table 3.2 Sample template format for case =1. l
Signature Energy 1 
1S  
1σ  
. 
. 
. 
Signature Energy N 
NS  
Nσ  
The number of templates generated depends intimately on the specificity desired for 
explosive identification and on the characteristics or level of complexity of the target. For 
example, identifying large-volume explosives in a briefcase will require far fewer templates than 
will be needed to identify a small anti-personnel mine hidden in a car trunk with thick shielding. 
Clearly, important factors such as intensity of the beam, interrogation time, volume of explosive, 
thickness of the target, density of the target and distance of the target must all be considered.  
Although theoretically infinite possibilities for template generation exist, it is assumed 
that a finite universe of templates may prove sufficient. The basis for this assumption relies on 
the ability for one template to match a group of closely related types of explosive target 
scenarios. First, it is not critical for an unknown explosive target to match a template perfectly. 
Thus, a finite number of templates may be generated that approximately represents a broad range 
of explosive target types. One of these templates should identify several explosive targets that 
are similar, but not identical to it. If this is possible, a finite number of templates may be enough 
to identify many IEDs. It will be demonstrated that it is possible to minimize the number of 
templates through a process of discretizing target composition and density. Also, it will be shown 
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that a tiered process can eliminate the majority of inert targets quickly. For example, nitrogen is 
rarely present in significant proportions in most inert materials. If the figures-of-merit for 
nitrogen are checked first, it is possible to eliminate many inert samples very rapidly. Further 
explanation of grouping techniques and their effectiveness appears later in the thesis. 
3.5 Figure-of-merit Analysis Technique 
           The SBRS method (Dunn, et al. 2007a; Dunn, et al. 2007b) is an implementation of a 
template matching procedure. It involves calculating a figure-of-merit, ζ, from responses, called 
signatures, and their variances obtained from a test target. Define the figure-of-merit as 
 ( )( ) ( )
2
2 2
1
N
i i
i
i i i
R S
R S
βζ α σ β σ=
−= +∑ ll l ,              (3.3) 
where Ri  is the response of the ith signature from an unknown sample and is the iiSl
th signature 
from the  template, N is the number of signatures, β is a factor that scales the measured 
response values to relate to the template values, 
thl
2σ is the variance, and iα  is a weight factor, 
which is normalized and given by 
 
1
i
i N
i
i
w
w
α
=
=
∑
,              (3.4) 
with  a relative weight assigned to the i0iw ≥ th signature. The standard deviation of the figure-
of-merit may be estimated as 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
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i i
i
i i i
R S
R S
βσ ζ α β σ σ=
⎡ ⎤−= ⎢ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ ll
l
⎥ .          (3.5) 
 If there is a close match between a template and a response, the figure-of-merit is small, 
while for poor matches, the figure-of-merit is much larger. Thus, in principle, an IED should 
have a small figure-of-merit and an inert target a large figure-of-merit. To prevent 
misidentification of targets, it is helpful to specify a margin of error. For this purpose, filter 
functions, f± , are introduced 
( , ) ( )f λ ζ λσ ζ± = ±ll l ,            (3.6) 
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where λ  is a parameter that can be used to adjust the false positive and false negative rates. The 
filter functions, f± , ensure the value of the FOM will be sufficiently above or below a cutoff 
FOM value,  fo, which will be determined experimentally. Thus, the method will establish the 
specificity for screening suspect targets. If  ( )f λ−  > fo , a suspect target is deemed inert within a 
confidence level determined by λ . However, if ( )f λ+  ≤ fo, a suspect target is labeled as an 
explosive. If neither premise holds true, the test is deemed inconclusive. A false positive 
indicates an inert material labeled as an explosive and a false negative indicates an explosive 
labeled as an inert. The specificity is related to the false positive rate through  
 number of True NegativesSpecificity = 
number of True Negatives + number of False Positives
,      (3.7) 
and the sensitivity is related to the false negative rate through  
 number of True PositivesSensitivity = 
number of True Positives + number of False Negatives
.      (3.8) 
These are manipulated by adjusting either fo or λ , or both. In equation, (3.7), a specificity of 
100% indicates no false positives, and in equation (3.8), a sensitivity of 100% indicates no false 
negatives. In explosive detection both high specificity and high sensitivity are sought.  
In all simulations and analyses performed except for those reported in section 5.3.3, β=1 
was used. Also, unit weight factors for each signature energy were generally used. However, 
simulations often did not incorporate the full list of signature energies, which implied weight 
factors of zero for absent signature energies.  
 A sufficient number of templates is necessary to ensure small figures-of-merit for IEDs in 
a variety of configurations. However, to minimize inert targets fitting a template through chance, 
it is important to minimize the number templates. Thus, a balance exists between achieving low 
false positives and low false negatives. Clearly, a foremost objective is to minimize false 
negatives and produce a technology ensuring high specificity. However, it is acceptable to have a 
specificity less than 100%, because some false positives are permissible. Furthermore, 
identification of other materials, including contraband or peroxide based explosives, may be 
possible with this technique. 
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3.6 MCNP Code for Simulation 
MCNP, standing for Monte Carlo N-Particle, is a particle transport code developed at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). MCNP has been evolving since its introduction during the 
cold war. The code is able to simulate neutron, photon, electron or coupled particle transport. Of 
particularly interest, it is capable of transporting neutrons of energies 0 to 20 MeV. When using 
the MCNP code, the user creates what is known as the input file. Thus, a simulated experiment is 
designed by creating an appropriate input file and running it in the MCNP5 code. The input file 
is a collection of ‘cards’ specifying information about particular parts of the simulated 
experiment. A title card, cell cards, surface cards and data cards are used to specify the desired 
geometry specifications, sources, materials and tally information. An example input file may be 
found in Appendix G. 
The code allows ray tracing by means of complex algorithms through user-defined 
geometries. Specifically, one may use the code to generate three-dimensional material 
geometries in what are defined as cells bounded by surfaces (X-5 Monte Carlo Team, 2003). The 
user specifies the cell boundaries by using surfaces and selects a side of the surface to contain the 
cell. This is decided by using a “+” to denote the outside of the surface and a “-“to denote the 
inside of the surface to define a cell. In this fashion, the user may specify a small universe in 
which certain geometries defined by multiple cells exist, along with a source and detectors. 
Because the code is a powerful modeling tool, enabling complex geometrical configurations to 
be modeled, it was used to model various target configurations to test the feasibility of the SBRS 
method and to model shielding for a 14.1-MeV neutron source. 
After the geometry is modeled, the user employs material cards to define materials that 
occupy cells. A material card specifies elements contained in a cell by their ZAID number, 
which is a three digit Z and a three digit A number followed by a cross section specification. For 
example, 16O may be specified, 8016.74c where .74c refers to the ENDF/V-BI cross section file. 
Initial simulations used cross section files of .50c (older cross section data) and more recent 
simulations used .66c and .74c cross section files. The code incorporates a regularly updated 
library of the ENDF/V-BI cross sections for neutrons and other particles based on experimental 
databases.  
The code also allows complex source and tally conditions to be specified. Several 
different distributions may define the source particle energy including a Maxwellian distribution 
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and a Watt distribution (the sources used in the simulations are described in chapters 4 and 5). 
MCNP uses estimators, referred to as tallies, to calculate and score radiation events. A tally 
scores events similar to an actual detector with perfect efficiency. Typically, for experiments, the 
tally F5 was used. In this tally, an interaction was scored and sorted according to binned energy. 
The tally F5 measures the fluence  
 
0
lim p p
A
N dN
A dAΔ →
ΔΦ ≡ =Δ ,            (3.9) 
which has units cm-2, where ΔA is the cross-sectional area of a sphere and Np is the expected 
number of particles entering that sphere in some time interval. In general, when modeling the 
interactions of neutrons with matter, either the diffusion equation or the neutron transport 
equation (NTE) must be solved. Because the NTE is more accurate than the diffusion equation, a 
solution to it is preferred. The MCNP code uses complex transport methods to trace the path of a 
neutron from a source to a detector. The NTE is one form of the more general Boltzmann 
transport equation that very accurately models the transport of particles. The steady state NTE 
equation can be written in the form  
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In this equation, ϕ  is the flux density as a function of position, r, energy, E, and angular 
direction, ; Ω sΣ  is the macroscopic total scattering cross section;  is the source term; and s Ef  
and fω are probability density functions where sω =cosθs and θs is the scattering angle.  
 As the name suggests, MCNP employs Monte Carlo methodology. Monte Carlo is a 
numerical procedure different than standard deterministic methods. Deterministic methods, such 
as discrete ordnances, generally develop approximate solutions to the transport equation. Monte 
Carlo solves the transport equation by tracing many individual particle histories and then 
averaging these histories to find the average behavior. The uncertainty in the result can be 
estimated using the central limit theorem (X-5 Monte Carlo Team, 2003). In particular, the 
Monte Carlo method describes a random statistical sampling process based on random number 
sampling that is used for solving problems numerically. The name “Monte Carlo” is derived 
from random number sampling, similar in comparison to throwing dice at a casino. Many 
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random number generators exist and work well for the Monte Carlo method. Generally, due to 
the large number of histories needed for adequate application of the central limit theorem, 
powerful computers are used when running the code. Fortunately, current processor speed and 
computer technology are sufficient to use the Monte Carlo method for solving the transport 
equation. If Moore’s law holds, computer technology should continue to become even faster in 
the future, allowing for an increased number of histories. A large number is imperative for 
assisting with variance reduction. This is a crucial aspect of the precision of simulated 
experiments. However, the accuracy of the simulated experiments depends on the nuclear 
physics theory supporting the code and the accuracy of the cross section data used. Because the 
MCNP5 code is thoroughly tested and was developed at Los Alamos by professionals, it is 
assumed to be an accurate code and is often used in the design of nuclear reactors and other 
systems. Therefore, given that the code is both accurate and precise, it is theoretically possible to 
test the feasibility of neutron interrogation for explosive detection through simulation. 
3.7 Data Analysis Techniques 
 To facilitate data analysis, often control scripts were used with the Perl language. Perl 
scripts were used in two ways. Primarily, Perl scripts were used in post-processing the MCNP 
output data files. With regular expressions and other features contained in Perl, it is possible to 
expediently and accurately process large amounts of text data for analysis. The regular 
expression function allows a user to search through a text file for a critical line of text and then 
extract data into variables typically stored in arrays in the script. Secondly, Perl scripts were used 
to generate MCNP input files and print them to a file. This was possible because a constant 
geometry was used in many input files, and thus the Perl script altered only the material cards 
and density via loops affecting both the ZAID numbers and their atomic fractions. 
 For the project, typically simulations with acceptable variance levels may be performed 
on a personal computer within a feasible time period. When histories are increased, it is more 
ideal to perform many simulations or more complex simulations with processors in parallel. 
Thus, to facilitate multiple simulations, a cluster of computers, consisting of several nodal 
processors called Hydra, was harnessed to increase the speed of simulations. This powerful 
system used up to 40 processors in parallel, allowing for an increased complexity, number of 
histories and number of simulations.  
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 Through computer simulations and data processing methods, it is possible to simulate 
many situations at a much faster rate than would be possible to test experimentally. Hence, to test 
an expensive and complicated technique, simulations using the MCNP code save both time and 
resources. Ultimately, however, even a method exhibiting simulated excellence should be 
experimentally verified.  
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CHAPTER 4 - Shielding and Collimation Simulations 
As mentioned in the goal statement, this research performed two main types of 
simulations. First, a series of simulations for shielding and collimating beams of neutrons for a 
D-T 14.1-MeV neutron source for the experimental portion of the SBRS project was performed. 
This work involved treating the D-T neutron generator as an isotropic point neutron source and 
then estimating both the collimation of the beam and the dose rates at different locations of the 
experimental laboratory. These simulations are considered in this chapter. 
Secondly, simulations were performed in which parallel disk sources of 252Cf and 14.1-
MeV neutron beams were incident on actual targets in various configurations. These were 
representative of ideal experimental collimated beams that would be used for actual 
interrogations. The objective of these simulations was to determine the effectiveness of the 
SBRS theory when applied to differentiate explosive targets from inert targets. These simulations 
are considered in the next chapter.  
4.1 Modeling of Shielding Design 
 Proper shielding of the D-T neutron generator is critical so that future experimental work 
will conform to regulations. A renowned shielding expert at Kansas State University, Dr. 
Kenneth Shultis, designed a multilayered collimator vault for shielding and collimating the 
neutron generator. Additionally, he designed a beam catcher to capture the neutron beam. The 
researcher modified Dr. Shultis’ initial design as experimental plans evolved. Materials used in 
the shielding design consisted of iron sheets, polyethylene sheets, 5% and 8% borated 
polyethylene sheets and concrete. Then, radiation dose rate estimations were calculated through 
multiple simulations with the MCNP5 code and averaged over small disk areas at different 
locations inside and outside of the simulated future laboratory. During normal operation, the 
level of exposure desired was 2 mrem hr -1 or below for safe operating conditions. Because the 
technology is still in research and development stages, the shielding plan was designed as 
laboratory prototype shielding, not as a portable shielded field system. Locations on the roof of 
the laboratory where the source will be installed were shielded with borated polyethylene and 
polyethylene sheets due to openings caused from skylights in the rooms. The shielding modeling 
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evolved as the research continued. Initially, a setup involving only one room for the hot zone was 
used; see Figures 4.1 and 4.2. In Figures 4.1 and 4.2, materials are designated as follows:  
 
Figure 4.1 Preliminary MCNP Visual Edit cross-sectional diagram of laboratory setup 
examining roof and floor radiation dose rates. 
 
Figure 4.2 Preliminary MCNP Visual Edit cross-sectional diagram of laboratory setup 
examining wall radiation dose rates. 
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concrete, pink; 8% borated polyethylene, yellow; iron, light blue; polyethylene, green; and 5% 
borated polyethylene, tan. Ultimately, the room shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 in combination 
with a neighboring room for the experimental setup was more favorable for construction and 
operation purposes. Thus, the shielding plan was adapted to incorporate two rooms into the 
model. The revised shielding plans are shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. 
 During the shielding design alteration, several changes were implemented that created a 
more optimal shielding configuration. First, the beam catcher was enlarged to stop more of the 
beam. Additionally, the mouth or beam entrance of the beam catcher was made smaller to limit 
backscattering of the beam. For the same purpose, a cavity was designed inside of the beam 
catcher causing more neutrons to scatter into inner portions of the beam catcher, reducing 
backscatter. Some input specifications for the simulations are provided in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Shielding input specifications (double room). 
Source Type: Mono-energetic, 14.1-MeV neutrons  
Source Bias: Isotropic point source 
Source Strength: 1011 n s-1  
Origin: Center of source collimator 
Source Position  (0,0,-20.32)  
93.98 cm (37 in.) above floor 
Operating Conditions Performed in a vacuum 
Dose Tallied Neutron dose rate (mrem hr -1) 
Photon dose rate (mrem hr -1) 
Tally Type F2 tally (with FM and SD cards) 
Ambient dose equivalent rates H*(10 
mm) averaged over disks, 10 cm in 
radius 
Source Collimator 
Dimensions 
218.44 cm (86 in.) × 218.44 cm  
(86 in.) × 233.68 cm (92 in.) 
Beam Catcher 
Dimensions 
167.64 cm (66 in.) × 182.88 cm  
(72 in.) × 175.26 cm (69 in.) 
Distance from Coll. to 
Beam Catcher Face 
266.3 cm (8 ft. 8 in,) 
(Includes dividing wall) 
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The dividing wall in between the rooms also assisted with shielding. Next, the beam was 
collimated along the diagonal inside the source vault in the double room configuration. This 
further lengthened the degree of collimation and helped minimize scattering within the rooms. 
The beam opening on the collimator vault was also altered from a square cross-sectional hole to 
a circular cross-sectional hole, creating a fan-shaped beam with azimuthal symmetry along the 
axis of the beam. A further collimated beam and an improved beam catcher helped lower 
scattering within the rooms. Thus, material resources were conserved by using fewer materials in 
low dose rate areas of the room, including the roof skylights and next to the walls. In Figures 4.3 
and 4.4, yellow denotes 8% borated polyethylene, green denotes regular polyethylene, red 
denotes concrete and light blue denotes iron. The dimensions of the insides of the two rooms are  
 
Figure 4.3 MCNP Visual Edit cross-sectional diagram of the double room laboratory setup 
examining roof radiation dose rates. 
as follows, listed in order of  x , y, z  dimensions. The smaller room had dimensions 548.64 cm 
(18 ft.) × 579.12 cm (19 ft.) × 314.96 cm (10 ft. 4 in.), whereas the larger room had dimensions 
568.96 cm (18 ft. 8 in.) × 386.08 cm (12 ft. 8 in.) × 314.96 cm (10 ft. 4 in.). The walls were 
typically 30.48 cm (1 ft.)-thick concrete, and the roof was 29.21 cm (11.5 in.)-thick concrete. 
The collimator vault and the beam catcher dimensions are shown in Table 4.1. The dose rates at 
many different points located on the walls, roof and floor were estimated. The specified points 
are shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. Dose rates at several different locations were estimated to 
ensure that the dose rate was uniform across the outsides of the rooms. For the points shown in 
Figure 4.3, dose rates for planes with x-values -60.0 cm, 60.0 cm, 170.0 cm, 260.0 cm, and 335 
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cm were calculated, assuming x=y=0 cm is the center of the collimator as shown in Figure 4.4. 
For the points shown in Figure 4.4, dose rates for planes with z-values -68.6 cm, -20.32 cm 
(beam height), 68.6 cm, and 99.1 cm were measured, where z= -114.3 cm was the floor height.  
 
Figure 4.4 MCNP Visual Edit cross-sectional diagram of the double room laboratory setup 
examining wall radiation dose rates (picture shown at source elevation, z=-20.32 cm). 
 Of the planes chosen, those exhibiting the highest dose rates are listed in Appendix A. 
The simulations showed that dose rates for all points measured outside the two rooms were 
below 2 mrem hr -1. Finally, a dose rate exceeding 2 mrem hr -1 was allowed within the rooms, as 
they would not be occupied during operation, and an interlock would be in place to turn off the 
source if a door into the room were opened. Overall, more operating room and improved beam 
collimation were achieved while using the double room configuration. 
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4.2 Neutron Beam Contour Mapping and Degree of Collimation 
Simulations were performed to examine the profile of the beam that was perpendicular to 
the collimator (single room setup shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2). It was critical for the design of 
the beam catcher and development of the interrogation technique that the approximate shape and 
intensity of the neutron beam be known. Therefore, simulations were performed to discretely 
map the beam intensity at different distances from the collimator vault. The results indicate the 
scattered neutron dose is dependent upon the level of collimation of the neutron beam and the 
dimensions of the opening of the beam catcher. When either was poorly chosen, a significant 
increase in scattered neutron dose resulted throughout the room. If the beam width at the position 
of the beam catcher face exceeds the mouth opening, significant scattering occurs, and the dose 
rates at other areas in the room increases substantially. However, if the opening is too large, then 
the beam will reflect out of the beam catcher without multiple scattering inside. This does not 
assist shielding and causes the neutron dose to increase within the rooms. Thus, these two latter 
effects must be balanced.   
The level of collimation of the beam was investigated by testing two sizes of collimation 
openings on the collimator, a 10.16×10.16 cm (4×4 in.) hole and a 5.08×5.08 cm (2×2 in.) square 
hole. Additionally, a one foot thick concrete wall was placed in front of the collimator with an 
identical hole cut for further collimation. The ambient equivalent neutron dose rate (mrem hr -1) 
was averaged over disks perpendicular to the direction of the beam in the y-z plan as shown in 
Figure 4.6. Estimates were performed at distances of 243.84 cm (8 ft.) and 365.84 cm (12 ft.) 
from the edge of the collimator and the concrete wall as seen in Figure 4.5.  
 
Figure 4.5 Cross-sectional diagram of xz-plane and beam collimation setup. 
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Figure 4.6 Schematic diagram of disks used for dose averaging in yz-plane. 
These estimates examined the beam’s intensity and width at two distances. The tabulated 
averaged dose rate results are given in Tables A.5 and A.6 of Appendix A. Surface plots 
demonstrating the beam intensity were generated, with example plots of the beam intensity 
incident on a normal plane positioned at x=243.84 cm shown in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 for the two 
different collimator hole sizes. The beam with the 5.08×5.08 cm hole showed an overall lower 
intensity than the 10.16×10.16 cm beam (see Tables A.5 and A.6). However, the 5.08×5.08 cm 
beam was better collimated (see Figures 4.7 and 4.8). Therefore, to keep scattering low, the 
5.08×5.08 cm collimation system was chosen and helped to minimize shielding expenses in the 
laboratory rooms. The intensity will be lower; however, it will still be more than sufficient for 
swift interrogation applications. 
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Figure 4.7 Semi-log plot of the Neutron beam intensity at 243.84 cm (8 ft.) incident on the 
yz-plane with 5.08×5.08 cm collimation hole. 
 
Figure 4.8 Semi-log plot of the Neutron beam intensity at 243.84 cm (8 ft.) incident on the 
yz-plane with a 10.16×10.16 cm collimation hole. 
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A second study of the contour of the neutron beam was performed with the final double 
room configuration (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). Here, the beam was changed from a square 5.08×5.08 
cm hole in the collimator to a circular hole, radius 2.8661 cm, because it represented the same 
cross-sectional area of the 5.08×5.08 cm beam. Modeling ring surface areas outward from the 
center of the beam, yielded the dose rate of the neutron beam, see Figure 4.9, on the normal front 
plane of the beam catcher as a function of the radius. The width of the beam catcher’s mouth was 
25.4×25.4 cm, which the beam clearly fits inside. A hand calculation was also performed to find  
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Figure 4.9 Estimated neutron dose rate as a function of radial distance on the front normal 
face of the beam catcher from a collimated 1011 n s-1 isotropic point source.  
the uncollided dose rate at this distance, r from a point source in a vacuum (Shultis and Faw, 
2000). It was found to be comparable to the simulated results shown in Figure 4.9. 
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Uncollided Dose Rate Calculation from a Point Isotropic Source: 
 The uncollided fluence from a point source emitting Sp particles a distance r from the 
source is 
( ) 24 po
S
r
rπΦ = .               (4.1) 
The dose from mono-energetic particles a distance r from the source is 
( ) 24 po
S R
D r
rπ= ,                        (4.2) 
where R is the appropriate detector response function for neutron ambient dose equivalents (H*), 
or R =5.2 E-10 (Sv cm-2) for neutrons of energy 14.0 MeV (ICRP 1996). 
r is found to be (from point source to beam catcher front face): 
2
2 2( ) (or x x y y= − + − 2)o
)
)
)
 = 445.5 cm and Sp = 1 part.                                  (4.3) 
Therefore, the dose at r is 
(445.5 oD cm =  2.085 E-16 Sv,                                         (4.4) 
and converting to rem with 1 Sv = 100 rem, 
(445.5 oD cm = 2.085 E-14 rem.            (4.5) 
Assuming a source strength of 1011 n s-1, and making appropriate unit conversions,  
the uncollided dose rate is approximately: 
(445.5 oD cm• =  7.50 rem h-1.           (4.6) 
4.3 Summary 
Shielding simulations for a 14.1-MeV D-T isotropic point source of neutrons yielded a 
general plan for the shielding configuration. The double room configuration was chosen for the 
future laboratory. While the problem was not trivial, the design of the neutron beam catcher and 
the neutron collimation vault proved adequate to maintain dose rates below 2 mrem hr -1 at point 
measured outside the rooms. Also, the double room configuration was found to generate 
satisfactory neutron beams of high intensity, ~ 7-8 rem hr-1, and sufficiently focused, ~ 14 cm in 
diameter, for interrogation of actual targets near the area of the beam catcher. The future 
laboratory was designed as a prototype, and therefore was a non-portable system. Future work 
for portable field applications will require further designing of the collimation system. 
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CHAPTER 5 - Target Simulation Modeling and Results 
5.1 Target Interrogation Simulations 
 This section describes target simulation parameters used in most simulations within this 
chapter. Primarily, the goal of SBRS is to detect IEDs, often placed in vehicles. Thus, a simple 
car trunk was simulated representing potential vehicle targets. Several geometries were tried; 
however, the primary geometry used for simulations is shown in Figure 5.1. Many materials 
were simulated as both the sample and as the clutter material; they are listed in Appendix C 
including their composition and densities. For this chapter, the notation used in target 
simulations will now be defined.  
 Sample – A steel cylindrical-shell volume approximately the size of 3.785 L      
 (1 gal.) paint can, which contains an unknown material. 
 Explosive – Nitrogen-rich explosive material that may occupy the sample   
 volume. 
 Inert – Any material that is not classified as a nitrogen-rich explosive (may be 
 otherwise dangerous) that may occupy the sample or clutter volume. 
 Clutter – A small rectangular volume of an inert material that may “shield” the 
 explosive sample within the target. 
 Target – A 1 m3 aluminum-shelled box that contains an unknown sample and 
 inert clutter. 
 IED – A target in which the unknown sample is an explosive. 
 Source – A MCNP disk source emitting either 14.1-MeV parallel neutron beams 
 or a Watt distribution from 252Cf parallel neutron beams, 7.62 cm in 
 radius. 
 Detector – A point flux detector F5 tally used in MCNP with radius 10 cm. 
5.1.1 Target Geometry Specifications 
The targets’ 0.2 cm aluminum shell was used to resemble a car trunk. One face of the box 
rested on the xy-plane, centered on the origin. The target rose in the z-direction and its center 
was located at z=50 cm; it contained a sample, which was composed of a cylindrically-shaped 
carbon steel shell. The sample was used to house explosive and inert materials and had a radius 
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7.62 cm, height 20.75 cm and thickness 0.12 cm, with inner volume 3.785 L. The sample was 
centered in the target in the x, y and z directions at coordinates x=y=0 and z=50 cm. The target 
also contained a rectangular parallelepiped of clutter material 50 cm in height (z-direction), 32 
cm in length (x-direction) and 10 cm in width (y-direction). The clutter material was placed in 
between the source and the cylindrical sample, as shown schematically in Figure 5.1. The center 
of the clutter material was offset in the y direction to y= -17 cm, and centered in the x and z 
directions at x=0 and z=50 cm within the target. The source was located at coordinates: (0, -150, 
50), or a 1 m standoff distance from the nearest target face. It was aimed directly toward the 
middle of the clutter, cylindrical sample, and target box, at z=50 cm parallel to the y-axis and 
traveling in the positive y-direction. The gamma-ray fluence was tallied with an F5 tally (point 
detector) at a position 153 cm away from the outermost point of the target at coordinates (200, -
100, 50). Simulations were performed in a vacuum using 4-keV wide energy bins in a tally, each 
with the signature energy at the center of the bin. The width of the energy bins was chosen to be 
similar to the energy resolution of some HPGe detectors. 
Point Flux Photon 
Detector, 10 cm 
Radius
14.1 MeV  Parallel 
Neutron Beam
1m
Aluminum Box Containing 
Sample and Clutter
Clutter
3.785 L (1 gal.) 
Sample
15.24 
cm
n
n
Vacuum1m
1.5 m
x
y
n
γ
 
Figure 5.1 Schematic diagram of simulated target geometry. 
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 In all simulations, histories of at least 10 million and up to 50 million particles were 
simulated. All tally F5 fluence responses and their deviations were multiplied by a factor of 1012 
neutrons for legibility. Several locations were tried for placement of the point detector with all 
positions located near source. For detectors with similar distances to the sample, the responses 
received at different detector positions were similar, due to target symmetry (without the clutter 
present). It is sought to keep detectors close to the target, because the response decreases as 1/r2. 
However, it was placed at least 1 m away to achieve stand-off detection and was located near the 
source, because ideally the detection equipment for SBRS should be close together. The detector 
position shown in Figure 5.1 was used for all simulations in chapter 5, except section 5.2 and 
5.4.3. However, shielding requirements of an experimental prototype would constrain detector 
locations. Ideally, the detector would be located near the source, but such that the geometry of 
the target would minimize the effect of clutter. For example, if a rectangular shaped target is 
interrogated, the detector should be placed such that it is exposed to side of the target that is the 
least thick. Thus, if the target contained homogenous clutter throughout, the response would 
travel through the least amount of attenuating material, increasing the detection probability. In 
initial simulations, the clutter volume was not used. Later simulations involved the clutter 
volume, and many possible inert materials were considered, as either the clutter, or the sample 
and the clutter.  However, the detector was positioned such that the gamma ray fluence from the 
sample did not travel through a significant portion of the clutter volume. 
5.1.2 Neutron Sources Used for Target Simulations 
Two neutron sources were simulated for explosive interrogation. Initially, a 252Cf 
spontaneous fission neutron source was investigated, generating a Watt fission spectrum  
 ( ) exp( / )sinh( )f E C E a bE= − ,           (5.1) 
with constants a=1.025 and b=2.926 from MCNP5 manual I. Because 252Cf is a portable neutron 
source and less costly than a neutron generator, it was used initially for interrogation purposes. 
The second and primary source used in the simulations was a 14.1-MeV neutron beam, 
representative of a collimated D-T neutron generator neutron beam. For this source, a mono-
energetic beam was assumed, although the actual energy distribution may vary slightly from 
generator to generator but should be primarily composed of 14.1-MeV neutrons. A plane parallel 
 43
disk source, radius 7.62 cm (3 in.) specified both sources, similar to a highly collimated neutron 
point source at some distance away.  
5.1.3 Estimated Count Time Required with a HPGe Detector and 14.1-MeV Neutrons 
of Intensity 1011  s-1. 
 Assume a gamma-ray fluence γΦ  from the RDX sample (with distance > 2 m) of energy 
E=2 MeV incident upon the location of the point detector that can be approximated by a parallel 
beam. Also, assume a HPGe crystal is positioned at the location of the point detector as shown in 
Figure 5.2, perpendicular to the beam. Typical responses from the F5 tally within a 4-keV energy 
γΦ
 
Figure 5.2 Parallel gamma-ray fluence incident upon a HPGe detector. 
bin centered on the signature energies in target simulations were of the order of magnitude of 10-
9 to 10-8 -2cm , normalized per source neutron. Thus, assume a fluence of 2 MeV gamma rays 
incident on the point detector of 
9 -
γ 5 10  cm
−Φ = × 2
2
.                        (5.2) 
The 80% efficient HPGe detector from Canberra, model: GC8021 has crystal dimensions: radius 
r= 3.675 cm and length x= 7.25 cm. A density ρ= 5.32 g cm-3 was assumed for the crystal. The 
area of the detector is 
2
det r 41.43 cmA π= = .              (5.3) 
The photoelectric absorption attenuation coefficient for photons with E=2 MeV, is  
4 2 -1 -3 -1(2.02 10 cm  g )(5.32 g cm ) 0.00107 cmoμ μ ρ −= = × = .       (5.4) 
The intrinsic full-energy efficiency of the detector can be approximated by 
( ) 1 xE e με −= − .             (5.5) 
Therefore, for photons of energy E =2 MeV, the intrinsic efficiency is 
(2 MeV) 0.00776ε = .             (5.6) 
 44
Finally, the counts in the full energy peak per source neutron are approximately  
( )( )( )9 -2 2γ det 5 10  cm 42.43 cm 0.00776 1.65 10A ε − −Φ = × = × 9
=
.           (5.7) 
For a neutron source intensity=1011 s-1 and a time= 10 s, the number of counts in the full energy 
peak would be approximately 
( )-9 11 -1Counts= 1.65 10 (10  s )(10 s) 1646× .          (5.8) 
Therefore, with a 14.1 MeV neutron source of intensity 1011  s-1 and an efficient HPGe detector, 
it is approximately feasible to obtain significant counts for the detection of explosives in terms of 
seconds. 
5.2 Interference Gamma Rays from Low-to-Mid Atomic Number Elements 
It would be very useful for the purpose of explosive detection to obtain characteristic 
signature energies from the elements H, C, N, and O. Ideally, signature energies would be easy 
to detect and unique. However, almost all elements can emit numerous gamma rays during de-
excitation. Some of these gamma rays may be emitted by elements at energies equivalent to or 
very near the signature energies shown in Table 3.1. An interference gamma ray is one that is 
emitted by a nucleus from some element and whose energy is within a 4-keV wide energy bin of 
the energy of one of the signature energies in Table 5.1. A signature energy that is unique has no 
interferences and is conclusive in identifying the element from which it was emitted. Signature 
energies with little interference are better than those with much interference.  
The MCNP5 code was used to generate pulse height tallies from irradiation of elements 
with atomic numbers ranging from 1 to 30 by a 14.1-MeV source. 10 million histories were 
performed for each simulation. A one gallon cylindrical sample contained the element 
considered and had radius=7.62 cm, height=20.75 cm and center at (x=y=0, z=50) with the axis 
of the cylinder on the z-axis. A 14.1-MeV source was used identical to the source discussed in 
section 5.1. Natural densities were used for elements existing in a solid state (at STP). For 
gaseous elements (at STP), a density of 0.5 g cm-3 was used. A higher density than the natural 
density was used for gaseous elements to ensure the neutron beam would interact with a 
significant amount of the element. Because the noble gases below atomic number 30 
(specifically He, Ne and Ar) very rarely form compounds of significant densities, they were not 
included in simulations. Also, naturally existing isotopes of the 27 elements modeled that had an 
abundance of at least 1% of the element’s composition were included. A cylindrical detector of 
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germanium, density 5.32 g cm-3 was modeled and a gamma-ray pulse height tally (F8 tally) was 
recorded in the cell of the cylinder. The F8 tally provides the energy distribution of pulses in a 
cell, modeled after a physical detector. A very large germanium detector was used to ensure 
detection of many pulses. The cylinder had a radius of 9 cm and was 33 cm long. The detector 
was placed near the target with the base of the cylinder orientated towards the target. The center 
of the base was located 85 cm away from the center of the target. The axis of the cylinder was 
parallel to the normal of the side of the sample at a height of z= 50 cm (center of the sample). 
The pulse height tally was binned by energy with 4-keV wide bins, from 0 to 11 MeV.  
Using the MCNP output, spectra for H, C, N, and O first were constructed. Each peak 
was fit by a Gaussian distribution with MATLAB. This was similar to a spectrum using a HPGe 
detector with decent energy resolution (HPGe detectors typically have ~2.5 keV energy 
resolution). The N spectrum for energies 0-10 MeV is shown in Figure 5.3. The pulse height 
spectra for H, C, and O are shown in Figures F.1–F.3 of Appendix F. 
 
Figure 5.3 MCNP simulated pulse height tally spectrum for a sample containing pure N 
irradiated by 14.1-MeV neutrons. 
Next, the number of peaks emitted into the same 4-keV wide bin that one of the signature 
energies was emitted into was found for each of the remaining 27 elements (elements whose Z is 
from 1 to 30, less He, Ne, and Ar). Peaks were considered to occur in bins with counts exceeding 
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the local count continuum by 2σ. These peaks were considered interferences. The same process 
was applied to an RDX sample to see if the signatures energies in Table 3.1 could be identified 
as peaks from RDX, and results are shown in Table 5.1. Table 5.1 also shows the total number of 
interferences found for each signature energy from 27 elements and their naturally occurring 
isotopes. Results showing the number of interferences for each signature energy found from each 
of the 27 elements are given in Appendix B.  
Table 5.1 The number of interference peaks emitted into 4-keV wide energy bins 
containing the signature energies that had counts exceeding 2σ of the count continuum 
from a pulse height tally for 27 elements and the peaks found from an RDX sample. 
Element Signature 
Energy (MeV) 
Total Interference Peaks Peaks with RDX 
Sample 
H 2.2232  1 
C 1.2618 1  
 3.6839 2 1 
 4.4390 2 1 
 4.9453   
N 0.7284 1 1 
 1.6353 22 1 
 1.8848 1  
 2.3128  1 
 2.7931 1 1 
 3.3786 1 1 
 3.8907 1 1 
 4.9151  1 
 5.1059  1 
 5.2692 1  
 6.4462 1 1 
 7.0291  1 
 10.8291   
O 0.8707 1  
 1.0879 3  
 2.1845 2  
 2.7420  1 
 6.1299  1 
 6.9171 1 1 
 7.1168  1 
 
 
 
 47
Next, optimal signature energies were selected from Table 5.1, where an optimal 
signature energy had a peak from the RDX sample, and no interferences. However, C had no 
signature energies without interferences; therefore, optimal signature energies for C were 
selected that had a peak from the RDX sample and the least number of interferences. 
Interestingly, the C sample had no peak for the 3.6839-MeV signature energy, but N and O were 
found to have interferences. Most likely, the peak from the RDX sample for the 3.6839-MeV C 
signature energy is not from C but either N or O, because the concentration of C is much lower 
within the RDX sample than within the C sample. A N prompt-capture gamma ray (not included 
in Table 3.1) might have caused the interference, which was emitted at 3.6777 MeV with cross 
section 0.0115 barns (Molnar, 2004). This energy was not contained within the 4-keV wide 
energy bin (limits 3.6831 – 3.6869 MeV), which suggests that the MCNP END/F database may 
have used a slightly higher energy value. Examining the NNDC database for O, no gamma rays 
were found to be emitted within the energy bin for this signature energy. It is unclear what 
caused this interference, but it must be from data in the MCNP database. Whatever the case, the 
C 3.6839-MeV signature energy was not selected to be an optimal signature energy. C was found 
to have a large peak within the bin for the 4.4390-MeV signature energy. However, both N and 
O samples also had interferences with this signature energy. However, no gamma rays from the 
NNDC database were found near the energy of 4.4390 MeV for either O or N. Therefore, the C 
signatures in Table 3.1 were not found to be unique within the bounds of this study; nevertheless, 
the 4.4390-MeV signature energy was selected for C. The results were very encouraging. Nine 
optimal signature energies were found and are shown in Table 5.2. Thus, if the SBRS method 
exploits these optimal signatures, it should be a powerful method for explosive identification. 
Table 5.2  The 9 optimal HCNO inelastic-scatter and prompt-capture signature energies. 
Element Signature Energy 
(MeV) 
Thermal Cross 
Section (barns) 
14.1-MeV Cross 
Section (barns) 
H 2.2232 0.3326 - 
C 4.4390 - 0.2106 
N 2.3128 - 0.0557 
N 4.9151 - 0.00687 
N 5.1059 - 0.0437 
N 7.0291 - 0.0242 
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O 2.7420 - 0.0433 
O 6.1299 - 0.144 
O 7.1168 - 0.0625 
5.3 Simulations Using Strictly Explosive or Inert Samples and the Average 
Explosive Template 
This section addresses results dealing with either explosive or inert samples (no clutter), 
two neutron sources and the effect of having the sample off-set from the beam in the xy-plane. 
First, a 252Cf neutron source was used for simulations. Then, simulations were performed with a 
14.1-MeV neutron source.  
5.3.1 Results Using a 252Cf Neutron Source 
A 252Cf spontaneous fission neutron source was modeled as a collimated disk source, 
emitting a cylindrical beam 3 cm in radius parallel to the y-axis as described in section 5.1. In 
these simulations, only targets containing strictly explosive materials and strictly inert materials 
were examined. The objective was to test the ability of SBRS to distinguish between nitrogen-
rich explosives and inert materials, using a portable 252Cf radioisotope source. 
During many experiments, particularly initial experiments, the optimal signature energies 
were not yet known. Thus, various signature energies were tried for their utility in explosive 
identification. These experiments were performed at the beginning of the research and used 11 
signature energies that are shown in Appendix D. Energy bins of ± 10 keV were used to bin the 
signature energies in tallies. Several different inert and explosive materials, shown in Table 5.3, 
were simulated. The densities and compositions for the materials modeled in these simulations 
can be found in Appendix C. A simple geometric scenario was used, identical to Figure 5.1, with 
the clutter volume absent. Two types of templates were used for analysis. First, templates were 
made by using responses for each of the simulated explosives individually. For example, an 
ammonium nitrate template was made from the responses of ammonium nitrate. Secondly, a 
template was formed from the responses of an average composition nitrogen-rich explosive, with 
composition 2.98% H, 20.29% C, 30.81% N and 46.14% O (National Research Council, 2004) 
and density 1.65 g cm-3. This template was defined as the average explosive composition 
template (AECT). 
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Results demonstrated that the AECT worked more effectively than individual explosive 
templates at differentiating multiple types of explosives. AECT results are shown in Table 5.3. 
Individual explosive templates were effective at differentiating the explosive they were designed 
for, ie. the ammonium nitrate template clearly differentiated ammonium nitrate, but could not 
differentiate other explosives well.  
Table 5.3 252Cf neutron beam results with AECT for 21 explosive materials and 11 inert 
materials. 
Sample Material ζ σ(ζ) f-(3) = ζ - 3σ(ζ) f+(3) =ζ+3σ(ζ) 
Ammonium Nitrate   5114.26 43.13 4984.89 5243.63 
Ammonium Picrate 59.85 4.67 45.85 73.84 
Cyclonite (RDX) 67.11 4.94 52.29 81.94 
Guanidine Nitrate 1558.55 23.81 1487.14 1629.97 
HMTD 2060.26 27.37 1978.14 2142.37 
HNIW 5669.80 45.41 5533.58 5806.01 
Hydrazine Nitrate 4037.70 38.32 3922.75 4152.65 
Nitroglycerin 186.98 8.25 162.24 211.72 
Nitrotriazolone (NTO) 4718.73 41.42 4594.46 4843.00 
Octogen (HMX) 24.30 2.97 15.38 33.21 
PETN 195.45 8.43 170.16 220.74 
Picric Acid 3920.65 37.76 3807.38 4033.93 
TAGN 1860.26 26.01 1782.24 1938.29 
TATB 169.66 7.86 146.10 193.23 
Tetrazene 9431.12 58.56 9255.44 9606.81 
Tetryl 2080.81 27.51 1998.28 2163.33 
TNAZ 490.70 13.36 450.62 530.77 
TNB 3804.59 37.20 3693.00 3916.18 
TNT 194.32 8.41 169.10 219.53 
Trinitropyridine 11924.89 65.85 11727.34 12122.44 
Urea Nitrate 1177.80 20.70 1115.71 1239.88 
Air 47474.03 131.39 47079.87 47868.20 
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Aluminum 37893.57 117.39 37541.41 38245.73 
Concrete 23722.01 92.88 23443.38 24000.65 
Glass 42415.33 124.19 42042.75 42787.90 
Petroleum 29441.82 103.47 29131.40 29752.23 
Polyethylene 29354.60 103.32 29044.65 29664.55 
Soil 2094.44 27.60 2011.65 2177.23 
Soy 17180.21 79.04 16943.09 17417.33 
Steel 31411.00 106.88 31090.37 31731.62 
Water 28423.30 101.67 28118.31 28728.30 
Wood 5245.46 43.67 5114.43 5376.48 
  
 Uniform weight factors were used for the signature energies chosen and the AECT was 
applied to all targets. Choosing fo=15,000, soil and wood were false positives with  f+(3) values 
of 2177.23 and 5376.48, indicating that their signatures did not match well enough with those 
from the template. However, there were no false negatives because all 21 explosive targets had 
f+(3) values below fo=15,000, indicating that their signatures matched those from the template 
well. It was found that a 252Cf source can be used to achieve fairly good explosive-inert 
differentiation of targets containing only a single sample. However, disadvantages of a 252Cf 
source and other radioisotope sources are that they pose a risk of contamination and they decay 
with time. 
5.3.2 Results Using a 14.1-MeV Neutron Source 
 The second series of experiments used higher energy neutrons of 14.1 MeV, such as 
those from a DT generator. This source offered advantages of higher energy and higher intensity 
than an isotope source and was capable of generating additional signature energies. The same 
experimental parameters were applied in this set of experiments as in the previous section, with 
only the source energy altered. Because not all the signature energies had been identified yet and 
the optimal signature energies were not yet known, the eleven signature energies used for the 
252Cf experiments were used and are listed in Appendix D. Templates were fashioned in a similar 
manner, and the analysis code was used to determine the effectiveness of various types of 
templates. A third type of template was also used in addition to individual explosive templates 
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and the AECT. The third template is defined as the average explosive template (AET), and it was 
made as follows. The responses for the twenty-one explosives shown in Table 5.4 were averaged 
for each of the signature energies. Using error propagation, the standard deviations for each 
response in the average explosive template was estimated. A matrix of response vectors   
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was formed, where N indicates the signature number and n the explosive number, using the 
explosives shown in Table 5.4 arranged alphabetically. Similarly, a matrix of response standard  
deviations was formed. The standard deviation was calculated for row one of R
t
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This was performed for each row of the matrix to estimate the standard deviations for the AET. 
The results of the simulations with analysis using the AECT and the AET are shown in Tables 
5.4 and 5.5. It was found, that the AECT and the AET both worked reasonably effectively. 
Statistics of both template results are shown in Table 5.6.  
Table 5.4 14.1-MeV neutron beam results with AECT for 21 explosive and 11 inert 
samples. 
Sample Material ζ σ(ζ) f-(3) = ζ - 3σ(ζ) f+(3) =ζ+3σ(ζ)
Ammonium Nitrate 27777.4 100.5 27475.8 28078.9 
Ammonium Picrate 3585.7 36.1 3477.4 3694.1 
Cyclonite (RDX) 930.1 18.4 874.9 985.3 
Guanidine Nitrate 9493.0 58.8 9316.7 9669.2 
HMTD 10164.1 60.8 9981.7 10346.5 
HNIW 2116.4 27.7 2033.2 2199.7 
Hydrazine Nitrate 24086.5 93.6 23805.7 24367.3 
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Nitroglycerin 6098.8 47.1 5957.6 6240.1 
Nitrotriazolene 2994.9 33.0 2895.9 3093.9 
Octogen (HMX) 992.2 19.0 935.2 1049.2 
PETN 4699.7 41.3 4575.7 4823.7 
Picric Acid 8226.7 54.7 8062.6 8390.8 
TAGN 21095.2 87.6 20832.4 21357.9 
TATB 4060.6 38.4 3945.3 4175.9 
Tetrazene 57496.7 144.6 57062.9 57930.5 
Tetryl 3359.6 35.0 3254.8 3464.5 
TNAZ 885.6 17.9 831.8 939.4 
TNB 7719.3 53.0 7560.3 7878.2 
TNT 9885.0 60.0 9705.2 10064.9 
Trinitropyridine 5023.1 42.7 4894.9 5151.3 
Urea Nitrate 22095.3 89.6 21826.4 22364.2 
Air 115777.9 205.2 115162.3 116393.4 
Aluminum 101469.3 192.1 100893.1 102045.6 
Concrete 40619.2 121.5 40254.6 40983.8 
Glass 40244.5 121.0 39881.5 40607.4 
Petroleum 125414.0 213.6 124773.3 126054.6 
Polyethylene 129363.9 216.9 128713.2 130014.6 
Soil 41938.6 123.5 41568.1 42309.1 
Soy 51670.4 137.1 51259.2 52081.6 
Steel 100394.0 191.1 99820.8 100967.2 
Water 73442.5 163.4 72952.2 73932.8 
Wood 20321.0 86.0 20063.1 20578.9 
 
Table 5.5 14.1-MeV neutron beam results with AET for 21 explosive and 11 inert samples. 
Sample Material ζ σ(ζ) f-(3) = ζ - 3σ(ζ) f+(3) =ζ+3σ(ζ)
Ammonium Nitrate 78451.1 168.9 77944.4 78957.8 
Ammonium Picrate 7968.7 53.8 7807.2 8130.2 
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Cyclonite (RDX) 1687.2 24.8 1612.9 1761.5 
Guanidine Nitrate 17241.1 79.2 17003.5 17478.6 
HMTD 32689.8 109.0 32362.7 33016.8 
HNIW 5436.6 44.5 5303.2 5570.0 
Hydrazine Nitrate 79250.4 169.8 78741.1 79759.7 
Nitroglycerin 13365.7 69.7 13156.6 13574.9 
Nitrotriazolene 5563.5 45.0 5428.5 5698.4 
Octogen (HMX) 2076.9 27.5 1994.5 2159.3 
PETN 10342.1 61.3 10158.2 10526.1 
Picric Acid 17847.2 80.6 17605.5 18088.9 
TAGN 42029.7 123.6 41658.8 42400.6 
TATB 8012.4 54.0 7850.5 8174.3 
Tetrazene 320202.7 341.2 319179.0 321226.3 
Tetryl 7478.4 52.1 7322.0 7634.9 
TNAZ 2803.2 31.9 2707.4 2899.0 
TNB 16090.4 76.5 15860.9 16319.9 
TNT 19373.6 83.9 19121.8 19625.4 
Trinitropyridine 11174.7 63.7 10983.4 11365.9 
Urea Nitrate 55967.8 142.7 55539.8 56395.8 
Air 1562790.5 753.8 1560529.0 1565052.1 
Aluminum 954384.3 589.1 952617.0 956151.6 
Concrete 170551.0 249.0 169803.9 171298.1 
Glass 102691.7 193.2 102112.0 103271.4 
Petroleum 981769.5 597.5 979977.0 983562.0 
Polyethylene 991448.6 600.4 989647.3 993249.9 
Soil 192159.5 264.3 191366.5 192952.5 
Soy 276506.2 317.1 275554.9 277457.5 
Steel 891198.9 569.3 889491.1 892906.7 
Water 285541.3 322.2 284574.6 286508.0 
Wood 162539.7 243.1 161810.4 163269.1 
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Table 5.6 Comparison of results using AECT and AET. 
 AECT AET 
Average Inert ζ 76423.2 597416.5 
σ of Inert ζs 39373.3 492872.9 
Average Explosive ζ 11085.0 35954.9 
σ of Explosive ζs 13360.4 69175.2 
 (fo=35,000) for AECT (fo=100,000) for AET 
False Positives 1 0 
False Negatives 1 1 
  
 Using fo=35,000, the AECT had only one false positive, wood with f+(3)= 20578.9, and 
one false negative, tetrazene with f+(3)= 57,930.5. When the AET was applied with fo=100,000, 
tetrazene was again a false negative with f+(3)= 321,226.3; however, there were no false 
positives. Thus, the AET was more effective. Tetrazene is particularly difficult to distinguish 
among explosives because it has a density of 0.45 g cm-3 and is 74.44% N by weight, differing 
strongly from the average explosive composition and density of 30.81% weight N and 1.65 g cm-
3 (see Appendix C). Using the average figure-of-merit and standard deviation from the figures-
of-merit for each class of materials, probability density functions were generated as shown in 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5, comparing the general effectiveness of the AECT and the AET. Overall, 
 
Figure 5.4 PDF comparing the figures-of-merit for two classes of materials, nitrogen-rich 
explosives and inert materials, with AECT. 
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Figure 5.5 PDF comparing the figures-of-merit for two classes of materials, nitrogen-rich 
explosives and inert materials, with the AET. 
the results show improvement with the 14.1-MeV neutron source compared to the 252Cf neutron 
source. Therefore, only the 14.1-MeV source was focused on in remaining experiments. 
5.3.3 Placement of the Sample in the XY-Plane 
Let direct interrogation refer to the situation in which the center of the beam is aligned 
with the center of the target and let off-set interrogation refer to the situation in which the centers 
are off-set from each other. In these simulations, the neutron beam sometimes only partially 
overlapped the sample, similar to what occurs during target scanning in which a neutron beam 
sweeps across a fixed target. An average explosive sample was first placed completely in the 
path of the beam as in direct target interrogations and the response was found. Next, the sample 
was off-set from its initial position by 7.62 cm laterally (x-direction), such that the beam passed 
through only one-half of the sample. The results were examined to determine how the off-set 
affected responses (see Table 5.7). Recall these experiments used a perfectly collimated beam  
Table 5.7 Average explosive response for direct and off-set interrogation. 
Element Signature Energy (MeV) Direct R σ(R)   Offset R σ(R) 
H 2.2232 3025.36 28.44  1501.15 20.57 
C 1.2618 2778.59 72.24  1322.87 17.73 
 3.6839 19002.5 49.41  7503.33 29.26 
 4.439 52473.4 78.71  20924.2 48.13 
 56
 4.9453 2803.74 21.03  1175.7 13.76 
N 1.6353 5562.65 27.26  2187.42 17.28 
 1.8848 784.16 16.7  456.01 12.59 
 2.3128 12630.5 39.16  4873.58 23.39 
 3.3786 2790.68 22.05  1214.91 14.82 
 3.8907 1565.38 18.32  708.7 12.47 
 4.9151 2104.24 17.68  894.57 11.9 
 5.1059 8322.06 33.29  3432.09 20.59 
 5.2692 326.29 10.38  200.69 8.19 
 6.4462 2186.43 17.27  934.4 11.77 
 10.8291 72.51 3.04  31.98 2.05 
O 0.8707 5564.46 45.07  2414.96 25.84 
 2.1845 724.18 16.66  464.84 13.67 
 6.1299 38620.5 65.66  15648.6 40.69 
 6.9171 14082.2 42.25  5809.59 25.56 
 7.1168 16205 45.37  6636.28 27.87 
 
with radius 7.62 cm (3 in.). The sample had diameter 15.24 cm (6 in.) and height 20.752 cm 
(8.17 in.), with the beam passing through the entire width and height of the sample during direct 
interrogation. Because the optimal signature energies had not been identified at the time of this 
research, the twenty signature energies shown in Appendix D were used for these simulations.   
 As shown in Table 5.7, the responses when the sample was off-set relative to the beam 
are close to one-half the value of the normal responses. Therefore, the effect of the off-set was 
roughly linear. Also, scanning only part of an explosive target is similar to scanning a smaller 
explosive volume. This suggests that it may be possible to create templates based on either the 
explosive size or the amount of the target scanned by neutron beams. Ideally, templates will be 
made for discrete explosive sizes and a process similar to the one in section 5.4.2 will be applied. 
 Next, figure-of-merit results were calculated and are shown in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 using 
five explosives and five inert materials with the AET and the sample in the direct position and 
the off-set position. The scaling parameter β (in equations 3.3 and 3.5) was used first as 1 
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Table 5.8 Direct sample interrogation using AET to the find figures-of-merit. 
Sample Material ζ σ(ζ) f-(3) = ζ - 3σ(ζ) f+(3) =ζ+3σ(ζ) 
Aluminum 50846.50 96.15 50558.05 51134.95 
Concrete 19323.51 59.27 19145.69 19501.33 
Rubber 53580.62 98.70 53284.51 53876.72 
Steel 49976.99 95.32 49691.02 50262.96 
Wood 12435.84 47.55 12293.18 12578.49 
Ammonium Nitrate 10371.72 43.43 10241.44 10502.00 
Cyclonite (RDX) 401.90 8.55 376.25 427.54 
Nitroglycerin 3335.10 24.63 3261.23 3408.98 
PETN 2797.61 22.55 2729.95 2865.27 
TNT 2689.02 22.11 2622.69 2755.36 
 
 
Table 5.9 Off-set sample interrogation using AET with (a) β=1 (b) β=0.5 to the find the 
figures-of-merit. 
(a) 
Sample Material ζ σ(ζ) f-(3) = ζ - 3σ(ζ) f+(3) =ζ+3σ(ζ) 
Aluminum 63822.36 112.98 63483.42 64161.30 
Concrete 32954.93 81.19 32711.37 33198.48 
Rubber 50655.77 100.65 50353.81 50957.73 
Steel 64479.18 113.56 64138.50 64819.86 
Wood 33006.83 81.25 32763.09 33250.58 
Ammonium Nitrate 19013.38 61.67 18828.39 19198.38 
Cyclonite (RDX) 16953.92 58.23 16779.23 17128.61 
Nitroglycerin 18900.64 61.48 18716.19 19085.08 
PETN 18032.62 60.05 17852.46 18212.78 
TNT 19125.01 61.85 18939.47 19310.55 
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(b) 
Sample Material ζ σ(ζ) f-(3) = ζ - 3σ(ζ) f+(3) =ζ+3σ(ζ) 
Aluminum 54072.33 103.99 53760.35 54384.31 
Concrete 18201.30 60.34 18020.30 18382.30 
Rubber 47345.72 97.31 47053.79 47637.65 
Steel 54900.28 104.79 54585.92 55214.64 
Wood 12267.52 49.53 12118.93 12416.12 
Ammonium Nitrate 7146.22 37.81 7032.80 7259.64 
Cyclonite (RDX) 927.31 13.62 886.45 968.16 
Nitroglycerin 2900.81 24.09 2828.55 2973.07 
PETN 2271.20 21.31 2207.26 2335.14 
TNT 2520.32 22.45 2452.97 2587.68 
 
and then as 0.5. A β =0.5 value was chosen because the beam only interacted with one-half of the 
sample. No parameter other than β was altered in the analysis. The direct interrogation resulted 
in no false positives or false negatives with fo=11,000. The off-set sample using the AET with 
β=1 required a larger cutoff value, fo=25,000, but also had no false positives or false negatives. 
Finally, the off-set sample using the AET with β=0.5 and the same cutoff as the direct 
interrogation, fo=11,000, had no false positives or false negatives. However, taking the ratio of 
the average explosive figure-of-merit and the average inert figure-of-merit, one finds that when 
β=1 is used the ratio is 0.38 and when β=0.5 is used the ratio is 0.08 for the data in Table 5.9. 
Therefore, with β=0.5 the average explosive and average inert figures-of-merit were much 
farther apart than the case with β=1, and thus results were improved. Clearly, judicious use of β 
may assist in template matching.  
5.4 Simulations with the 14.1-MeV Source Involving Clutter 
This section covers methods to deal with the problem of clutter in explosive-inert 
differentiation with a 14.1-MeV source. Methods of dealing with clutter examined include the 
following: templates that group clutter according to its density and an approach that uses tiers to 
group clutter according to its density and composition. Finally, clutter thickness is altered to 
observe the effect upon the responses. 
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5.4.1 Grouping Clutter by Density 
The effects of clutter materials could be managed by making a template for each type of 
clutter material in front of RDX. However, this would require many templates to account for all 
possible clutter materials. As mentioned, excessive templates may lead to false positives 
occurring by chance. Therefore, it is desired to keep the number of templates as small as 
possible. Thus, a method was explored that requires fewer templates by grouping clutter 
materials according to their density.  
Twenty-five inert materials were chosen for the simulations, with an effort made to 
choose common materials possessing diverse compositions. The experimental parameters 
specified in section 5.1 were used for the simulations. RDX was chosen for the explosive 
because it is a very common military explosive used in artillery shells, which often are 
transformed into IEDs. 
Initially, twenty-five clutter materials were simulated while the sample material, RDX, 
was held constant. Next, twenty-five more simulations were performed, that used the same inert 
material for both the sample and the clutter. Combinations of differing inert sample and inert 
clutter materials were not considered. Thus, fifty simulations were performed. The twenty-five 
inert materials were separated into four groups based on density including very low density 
(VLD, 0-0.5 g cm-3), low density (LD, 0.5-1.5 g cm-3), medium density (MD, 1.5-3.0 g cm-3) and 
high density (HD, 3.0-8.0 g cm-3). Then, a template was generated for each density group, 
resulting in a VLD template, a LD template, a MD template and a HD template. This was 
accomplished by averaging the responses of RDX for each signature energy with inert clutter 
materials within the density range of the group.  
Next, each of the four templates was applied to all fifty targets to calculate figures-of-
merit and f± (1) values, using all templates on all targets. Responses and their standard deviations 
and the VLD, LD, MD and HD templates that were used to calculate these values are listed in 
Appendix E. Using the f+(1) values found from explosive targets, a cutoff value of 
was chosen. The false positive and false negative results are shown in Tables 5.10-
5.13. Only the five N signature energies listed in Table D.3 were used in this analysis. Unit 
weight factors were used. It was found that when the signature energies from H, C, and O were 
included in templates the results became worse. This was because significant concentrations of 
H, C, and O are present in most common inert materials, and therefore interfere with HCO 
0 2,000f =
 60
signatures from an RDX sample. Significant concentrations of N, however, are found much more 
rarely in inert materials. Thus, this method capitalized on the relatively low N content of 
common inert materials and the relatively high N content of nitrogen-rich explosives. 
Table 5.10 Results for the VLD clutter group, density 0– 0.5 g cm-3. 
VLD Inert Material Density (g cm-3) False Positives 
(Inert/Inert) 
False Negatives 
(RDX/Inert) 
Air 0.001205   
Polyurethane (foam) 0.10   
 
Table 5.11 Results for the LD clutter group, density 0.5– 1.5 g cm-3. 
LD Inert Material Density (g cm-3) False Positives 
(Inert/Inert) 
False Negatives 
(RDX/Inert) 
Ethanol 0.80   
FertA (nitrogenous) 0.81 X X 
FertB (non-nitrogenous)  0.99   
Gasoline  0.68   
Nylon 1.14 X  
Petroleum 0.97   
Plexiglass 1.19   
Polyethylene  0.93   
Rubber 0.92   
Soy 0.72   
Water 1.00   
Wax 0.93   
Wood 0.75   
 
Table 5.12 Results for the MD clutter group, density 1.5– 3.0 g cm-3. 
MD Inert Material Density (g cm-3) False Positives 
(Inert/Inert) 
False Negatives 
(RDX/Inert) 
Aluminum 2.70   
Bricks 1.80   
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Carbon ( Graphite ) 1.70   
Concrete 2.35   
Glass 2.40   
Granite 2.73   
Salt 2.18   
Soil 1.61   
 
Table 5.13 Results for the HD clutter group, density 3.0–8.0 g cm-3. 
HD Inert Material Density (g cm-3) False Positives 
(Inert/Inert) 
False Negatives 
(RDX/Inert) 
Steel 7.85   
Copper 8.92   
 
It was found that using a cut-off value of 0 2,000f = , RDX was identified in all but one 
target in which it was present (the f+(1) values of explosive targets were below 2000). The 
correct template for each density group differentiated RDX with clutter materials having a 
density within the group, for all targets except one. For example, the VLD template identified 
RDX with each of the VLD clutter materials air and polyurethane. Thus, each template filtered 
out the targets for which it was designed. The only false negative occurred with the LD template, 
with FertA as clutter in front of cyclonite for which the f+(1) value was 13,160. There were only 
two false positives, FertA (as sample and clutter) and Nylon (as sample and clutter), with f+(1) 
values 715 and 786, respectively. Both of these inert materials contain N (see Appendix C). For 
example, FertA is composed of 0.36 weight percent N. Because only N signatures were used, it 
is expected that inert materials containing substantial amounts of N may yield false positives or 
false negatives with these templates. Therefore, to prevent false negatives, this technique would 
require a N response size cutoff to “flag” any nitrogen-rich target as being a possible IED. Thus, 
unknown targets having a N response exceeding a specified N cutoff response, would be labeled 
as suspect explosive targets. The next section helps overcome the problem of false positives with 
nitrogen containing clutter by adding the signature energies of H, C, and O to discriminate 
against N containing inert targets while still accounting for the effects of clutter.  
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5.4.2 Grouping Clutter by Composition and Density with a Tiered Filter Approach 
In the last section it was shown that the number of templates may be reduced by grouping 
inert clutter materials by a shared characteristic of the materials, specifically, their density. 
Furthermore, density is not the only characteristic by which materials can be grouped; 
composition is another such characteristic. In this section, it will be shown that grouping clutter 
by density and composition is superior for explosive-inert differentiation than grouping clutter 
only by its density.  
Clearly, as shown in the last section, clutter density is a variable that should be accounted 
for in templates that deal with clutter. Also, because the signature energies are based on 
responses from H, C, N and O, templates should account for various concentrations of these 
elements within clutter materials. For example, a clutter material composed of H will cause the 
2.2232-MeV H response to increase. However, explosive templates typically contain relatively 
low H responses. Therefore, a large figure-of-merit will result for the H signature when 
templates are applied to the explosive target with H-rich clutter. This may cause a false negative, 
depending upon what value is used for fo. Similarly, the same effects from the clutter can occur 
for the C, N and O signatures. Therefore, templates should be made to incorporate a contribution 
to the signatures by a clutter containing H, C, N, or O. Let any reduction of the gamma-ray 
signatures by an element within a clutter material be defined as attenuation. Density has been 
found to affect attenuation; however, it is already accounted for in a method described in the last 
section. The atomic number of the clutter material also affects the attenuation of the signature 
energies.Therefore, the effects of elements differing from HCNO are considered in the following 
section.  
5.4.2.1 Filler Elements 
Before an explanation of the tiered filter approach is considered, it is important to define 
what is meant by a filler element.  
• Filler Element (FE) – An element of atomic number Z’ chosen to represent attenuation 
caused by a group of elements in the periodic table close in atomic number to Z’. 
To help minimize the number of templates, it was desired to group elements close in atomic 
number together and represent attenuation caused by elements within the group by the 
attenuation caused by an element near the center of the group. Simulations were performed to 
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test whether attenuation by a FE was similar to attenuation caused by other elements near in 
atomic number to Z’, assuming a constant density.  
 First, elements having atomic numbers from 1 to 82 were divided into four groups based 
on the mass of their nuclei. The ratio between the masses of a Z-1 nuclei and a Z nuclei increases 
as atomic number increases. For example, the ratio of the mass of a H (Z=1) nucleus and a He 
(Z=2) nucleus is 0.25; however, the ratio of the mass of a K (Z=19) nucleus and a Ca (Z=20) 
nucleus is 0.98. Therefore, groups containing elements low in atomic number were chosen to be 
smaller than groups containing elements higher in atomic number. Noble gases were excluded 
because they are not present in typical clutter materials. Also, signature elements (HCNO) were 
not included in the study. They are incorporated into the tiered filter approach explained next. 
The ranges selected for the four groups are shown in Table 5.14. Next, every element at the  
edges of each group was simulated as the clutter material. The experimental setup from section 
5.1 was used with RDX as the sample. The clutter was composed only of one element and had a 
constant density of 1 g cm-3. Finally, the fluences of the signature energies from RDX with 
elements at the edges of each group used for clutter materials were examined. The fluences for 
the 2.3128-MeV N signature energy with clutter composed of elements at the edges of each 
group are shown in Figure 5.6. Overall, the fluence was attenuated by lower atomic number 
elements more strongly that higher atomic number elements (with density constant). These 
results indicate that the 2.3128-N fluence from the RDX sample appears not to be greatly 
influenced for clutter materials of constant density made of elements within a given group, 
except for the first group. Therefore, four FEs were chosen which had atomic numbers near the 
middle of each group; these elements are identified in Table 5.14. These FEs were used to 
represent, though not precisely, the attenuation (related to atomic number) from any clutter 
material composed of elements having atomic numbers within the groups shown in Table 5.14.  
Table 5.14 FEs chosen to represent four atomic number groups. 
 FE Group Atomic Number Range 
Group 1 Lithium 3-5     (Li–B) 
Group 2 Fluorine 6-9      (C-F) 
Group 3 Phosphorous 11-17  (Na-Cl) 
Group 4 Chromium 19-82  (K-Pb) 
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Figure 5.6. Comparison of the fluences of the 2.3128-N signature from RDX in the presence 
of clutter containing elements at the edges of each group shown in Table 5.14.  
 
5.4.2.2 Tiered Filter Approach 
 Next, templates were formed that incorporated the effect upon the responses of RDX 
from clutter materials varying in density and HCNO and FE composition. A systematic approach 
was implemented that employs filtering unknown targets in tiers or stages. Accordingly, the 
tiered filter approach requires a target to match several templates before it is classified as either 
an explosive, inert or unknown material (inconclusive test).  
 The simulation procedure was the same as for the last section. However, the number of 
clutter materials was increased to fifty. Thus, one-hundred simulations were performed with fifty 
inert/inert (sample/clutter) and fifty RDX/inert (sample/clutter). No simulations involved 
combinations of inert materials. One of the fifty clutter materials used was not a true inert but 
was instead the explosive, TNT, which was treated as “inert” clutter to determine the effect. 
Tables 5.20 and 5.21 list the materials used as inert samples and clutter. The responses of these 
target simulations were analyzed using a tiered filter approach, described below. 
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 Four tiers were used in the approach. The first tier, depicted in Figure 5.7, was designated 
to identify x, where x indicates the density template group from among the following density 
ranges: 
• Very Low Density (VLD) (0.0 – 0.5 g cm-3) 
• Low Density (LD), (0.5 – 1.5 g cm-3) 
• Medium Density (MD), (1.5 – 3.0 g cm-3) 
• High Density (HD), (3.0 – 11.0 g cm-3) 
 
Figure 5.7 Tier 1: density template groups. 
Each density template group contained four sub-template (ST) groups that were grouped 
according to the clutter’s HCNO composition. This was the second tier of the approach, 
illustrated in Figure 5.8, which identifies y, where y indicates the ST group (H STs, C STs, N  
 
Figure 5.8 Tier 2: ST groups. 
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STs or O STs). The third tier, shown in Figure 5.9, contained templates for each ST group within 
a density template group and was designated by z, where z indicates the template number.  
 
Figure 5.9 Tier 3: templates. 
Templates were made by performing simulations with artificial clutter materials in MCNP for 
particular HCNO and FE concentrations and densities.  
 Perl was used to generate many input files for artificial clutter materials and a RDX 
sample. The responses of these input files were used to form templates. These templates had the 
following characteristics. A template containing responses from RDX using only one of the 
signature elements H, C, N or O was paired with only one FE in the clutter. Only one FE was 
used for each density template group. This was to limit the number of templates and prevent 
unrealistic templates with FEs of unnatural densities (ex. Li in HD template group). The density 
template groups for which each FE was used are shown in Table 5.15.  
Table 5.15 FE used for each density template group. 
Density Template Group FE used for the Group
VLD Lithium 
LD Fluorine 
MD Phosphorous 
HD Chromium 
  
  Concentrations and densities of HCNO and FEs were divided into discrete groups. For 
each group, the concentration of an element ranged from 0-25%, 25-50%, 50-75% and 75-100% 
of the clutter composition. The midpoint of each concentration group was used to represent that 
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group (ie. for group 0-25%, 12.5% concentration was used). Similarly, the midpoint for each 
density template group was also used to represent the density template group (ie. VLD, 0.0 – 0.5 
g cm-3 implies density = 0.25 g cm-3). Table 5.16 demonstrates the concentration parameters 
(midpoints of the group ranges) governing the clutter compositions used for simulating 
templates. The number and specificity of the templates may be adjusted by altering the range of 
the concentration or density groups. The FE completes the remaining percentage of either H, C, 
N, or O composition of the clutter such that it totals 100%. Additionally, for templates where 
either the H, C, N, or O composition is 0%, the FE composes 100% of the clutter composition. 
Table 5.17 shows five O and Li concentrations used to make the five templates for the O ST 
group and VLD template group. Other templates in each ST group and density template group 
were made in a similar fashion.  
Table 5.16 Template parameters. 
S(x,y,z) H%, C%, N% or O% FE% 
S(x,y,1) 0 100 
S(x,y,2) 12.5 87.5 
S(x,y,3) 37.5 62.5 
S(x,y,4) 62.5 37.5 
S(x,y,5) 87.5 12.5 
 
Table 5.17 Five clutter compositions that were used to create the five templates for the 
VLD template group (0.25 g cm-3) and O STs group. 
S(x,y,z) O% Li% Density (g cm-3) 
S(VLD, O STs, 1) 0 100 0.25 
S(VLD, O STs, 2) 12.5 87.5 0.25 
S(VLD, O STs, 3) 37.5 62.5 0.25 
S(VLD, O STs, 4) 62.5 37.5 0.25 
S(VLD, O STs, 5) 87.5 12.5 0.25 
 
 Finally, the fourth tier involved calculating figures-of-merit and f± (1) values from the 
responses of each template and the responses from each target. The total number of templates 
contained within the approach is shown below and all templates were applied to all targets. 
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Total Template Number: 
(4 density template groups) × (4 ST groups) × (5 templates within each group) = 80 templates 
Judiciously, cutoff values were chosen using the f+(1) values for explosives targets. Each ST 
group within each density template group had a corresponding cut-off value, designated by fyox, 
as shown in Table 5.18. The cut-off values used for analysis are shown in Table 5.19. 
Table 5.18  ST group cutoff values. 
 VLD LD MD HD 
H  STs fHoVLD fHoLD fHoMD fHoHD
C  STs fCoVLD fCoLD fCoMD fCoHD
N  STs fNoVLD fNoLD fNoMD fNoHD
O  STs fOoVLD fOoLD fOoMD fOoHD
 
Table 5.19 Cutoff values used for each ST group. 
 VLD  LD MD HD 
H  STs fHoVLD = 1000 fHoLD = 250000 fHoMD = 6000 fHoHD = 1000 
C  STs fCoVLD = 4000 fCoLD = 11500 fCoMD = 34000 fCoHD = 3000 
N  STs fNoVLD = 1000 fNoLD = 2500 fNoMD = 2000 fNoHD = 3500 
O  STs fOoVLD =1000 fOoLD = 12000 fOoMD = 10000 fOoHD = 18000 
 
 Next, the explosive elemental content (EEC) is introduced that assures that a target 
matches the H, C, N or O content at least one of the templates to an accuracy given by the cut-off 
value used. Using the cut-off value of the ST group and the f± (1) values from templates within 
the group, a logic test was performed. The logic test returns one of three values for the EEC. If 
an EEC value of -1 exists for each ST group (H STs, C STs, N STs and O STs) within a density 
template group, this implies an explosive. If an EEC value of 1 exists for each ST group and 
there are no EEC values of -1 or 0 in found in each ST group, this implies an inert. Finally, if the 
EEC value is 0 for any ST group and there are no EEC values of -1 in the ST group, the test is 
inconclusive. Figure 5.10 demonstrates the fourth tier of the approach, which performs the EEC 
logic test. Finally, Figure 5.11 demonstrates the sequence of the tiered filter approach combining 
all four tiers for a specific case using x=VLD, y=H STs and z=1, which results in an EEC value 
of -1 (f- (1,1) <  fHoVLD). 
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Figure 5.10 Tier 4: EEC logic test. 
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Figure 5.11 Specific example applying the tiered filter approach for VLD template group, 
H ST group and the 1st H template, resulting in an f+(1,1) value ≤ than the correct cutoff.  
The results from the tiered filter approach were promising. Tables 5.20 and 5.21 show the 
false positives and false negatives found in the experiments using the tiered filter approach with 
cut-off values shown in Table 5.19. In this experiment, 1 H, 1 C, 5 N and 2 O signatures, listed in 
Table D.4, were used with unit weight factors. The optimal signature energies had not been 
found when the experiments were performed, but the majority of them, including at least one for 
each element, were used in the experiment (found by trial and error by using signatures that gave 
the best results). 
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Table 5.20 Results using a tiered filter approach. 
Inert Materials Density  
(g cm-3)   
False Positives 
(Inert/Inert) 
False Negatives 
(RDX/Inert) 
1 Air 0.001205   
2 Propane 0.0019   
3 Cyanurate 0.0321   
4 Styrofoam 0.1   
5 Polyurethane (foam) 0.1   
6 Cherry Wood 0.43   
7 Ash 0.641   
8 Gasoline 0.6837   
9 Cardboard 0.689   
10 Soy 0.721   
11 Wood 0.75   
12 Ethanol 0.8   
13 Soap 0.801   
14 FertA ( with nitrogen ) 0.81 X  
15 Rubber 0.92   
16 Polyethylene 0.93   
17 Wax 0.93   
18 Petroleum 0.973   
19 FertB ( non nitrogenous ) 0.99   
20 Water 0.998   
21 Tissue 1.04   
22 Polystyrene 1.06   
23 Antifreeze 1.1132   
24 Nylon 1.14   
25 Herbicide 1 1.17 X  
26 Herbicide 3 1.187   
27 Plexiglass 1.19   
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Table 5.21 Results using a tiered filter approach. 
 
Inert Materials 
 
Density  
(g cm-3) 
False Positives 
(Inert/Inert) 
False Negatives 
(RDX/Inert) 
28 Lucite 1.19   
29 Herbicide 2 1.25   
30 Sugar 1.54   
31 Cotton 1.55   
32 Soil 1.6104   
33 TNT (treated as an inert) 1.654 X  
34 Carbon (graphite) 1.7   
35 Borax 1.73   
36 Bricks 1.8   
37 Potassium Hydroxide 2.044   
38 Rock Salt 2.18   
39 Concrete 2.35   
40 Limestone 2.35   
41 Glass 2.4   
42 Ceramic 2.403   
43 Al 2.7   
44 Granite 2.729   
45 Titanium 4.54   
46 Zirconium 6.506   
47 Steel 7.85   
48 Nickel 8.9   
49 Copper 8.92   
50 Lead 11.35   
 
It was found that there were 2 false positives, FertA and Herb1, and no false negatives. 
Both FertA and Herb1 were in the LD template group and they each had f+(1) values below the 
cutoff values corresponding to each ST group and therefore were false positives. As shown in 
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Table 5.19, the cutoff values for the LD template group were fHoLD=250,000   fCoLD=11,500, 
fNoLD=2500 and  fOoLD=12,000 for H, C, N and O ST groups. FertA had minimum f+(1) values 
(for 5 STs in each ST group) 4734.7 (H), 2934.3 (C), 901.3 (N) and 3229.0 (O) for the LD 
template group H, C, N and O STs. Herb1 had minimum f+(1) values (for 5 STs in each ST 
group) 334.3 (H), 658.5 (C), 1886.0 (N) and 2061.5 (O) for the LD template group H, C, N and 
O STs. TNT as the sample and clutter was identified with the MD template group STs (the 
correct set for TNT, density 1.654 g cm-3), with minimum f+(1) values 3203.5 (H), 14,708.4 (C), 
665.4 (N) and 3074.5 (O), which were below the corresponding ST cutoff values for the MD 
template group. TNT was not counted as a false positive because it was an explosive.  
The tiered filter approach offers several advantages over earlier template matching 
techniques. Primarily, both composition and density are incorporated. Secondly, few templates 
are needed to characterize a large clutter material parameter space. A wide density range of 0-11 
g cm-3 was used, and elements of a wide range in atomic number were included in the material 
compositions. Thirdly, the method achieved a high specificity of 96% and a perfect sensitivity of 
100% (equations 3.7 and 3.8). Fourth, the cutoff values within a ST group are adjustable. Fifth, it 
incorporates a minimum nitrogen response by requiring a match within the nitrogen templates, 
and similarly requires minimums for elements H, C and O. The approach also effectively filters 
out many nitrogen containing clutter materials as shown in Table 5.22. Additionally, the  
Table 5.22 Nitrogen-containing clutter materials. 
Inert Material Nitrogen Atom Fraction Filtered Effectively 
Air 0.784437 Yes 
Polyurethane 0.076459 Yes 
Cyanurate 0.06900 Yes 
Herb2 0.06667 Yes 
Herb3 0.178572 Yes 
Tissue 0.02600 Yes 
Nylon 0.052632 Yes 
Herb1 0.076924 No 
FertA -0.3600 (weight fraction) No 
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explosive TNT was identified as explosive when it was used as “inert” clutter. Finally, the tiered 
filter approach may be programmed into an algorithm and thus be automated.  
5.4.3 The Effects of Clutter Thickness on Response Size 
In the preceding sections, clutter thickness was constant at 10 cm. In these simulations, 
the variable of clutter thickness was manipulated. The goal was to consider the maximum clutter 
thickness for a material in each density group in which an informative response may be detected 
from the RDX sample. The 14.1-MeV source was used. Four different inert clutter materials 
were simulated and the case with no clutter material, with one representing each density group 
including foam, polyethylene, concrete , steel and a vacuum. The target configuration was the 
same as section 5.1, with the exception of the clutter dimensions and detector and sample 
placement, with the configuration shown in Figure 5.12. The clutter material was first increased 
 
Figure 5.12 Geometry for simulations in which clutter thickness was increased. 
in height and length, such that it occupied a larger area in the xz-plane inside the target. Thus, the 
gamma rays from the sample must pass through the clutter volume for detection. Next, the clutter 
material was increased incrementally in thickness from 2.5 cm to 32.5 cm, as shown in Figure 
5.12. The responses for an optimal N signature, 2.3128 MeV, with non-nitrogenous inert clutter 
as a function of clutter thickness were plotted, as shown in Figure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.13 Responses from an RDX sample with four clutter materials and clutter absent 
as a function of clutter thickness for the 2.3128-MeV inelastic-scatter N signature. 
Figure 5.13 clearly shows that large thicknesses of the VLD clutter material (foam) poses little 
problem for detection, and detection of significant responses may occur with thicknesses up  
to and beyond 25 cm. The LD and MD clutter materials (polyethylene and concrete) attenuate 
the response at much sooner thicknesses, but detection should be possible with thicknesses of 
12.5-15 cm. The HD inert clutter material (steel) attenuates the response very quickly with 
detection only likely with clutter thickness less than 12.5 cm. Clearly, templates dealing with 
thickness will be needed to assist in differentiation.  
 The results of this study reaffirmed that altering clutter thickness and clutter density 
affect the RDX response. It is suggested that templates be made for targets at discrete 
thicknesses, and the scaling factor, β, be applied to interpolate. Results also suggest that 
differentiation may not be possible through very thick clutter, depending on the density of the 
clutter. Fortunately, with thick clutter, particularly very dense thick clutter, the danger posed by 
an IED detonation is minimized through absorption of the blast energy in the clutter. Therefore, 
it is less critical to identify heavily shielded explosives because they pose less danger. 
Additionally, this reduces the probability that thick explosive shielding will be used by terrorists. 
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CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions and Future Work with SBRS 
6.1 Discussion and Conclusions 
A shielding design has been simulated for producing a collimated beam from a D-T 
neutron generator, which emits 14.1-MeV neutrons isotropically. Estimated dose rates are below 
2 mrem hr -1 at all points tested outside the laboratory rooms. A neutron interrogation technique 
using fast and thermal neutron analysis with SBRS template matching has been demonstrated. 
The SBRS method was demonstrated with bare and shielded explosives. The results suggest use 
of a D-T neutron generator, with 14.1-MeV neutrons and a flux of 1011 n s-1, coupled with HPGe 
detectors, because of good efficiency and high energy resolution, for nitrogen-rich explosive 
interrogation. The research isolated 9 optimal signature energies with little or no interference and 
good probability for detection for the elements H, C, N, and O, which compose nitrogen-rich 
explosives. Simulations demonstrated that a neutron beam is potentially a powerful tool for 
explosive-inert differentiation because of its ability to penetrate shielding materials.    
Clutter in front of explosives was found to be a non-trivial problem. However, 
simulations demonstrated that explosives may be identified with good specificity and sensitivity, 
despite the presence of clutter of a fixed thickness (10 cm) in front of the explosives by 
constructing sub templates based on a finite number of density and composition variables. A 
tiered filter template matching approach, portrayed in section 5.4.2, was shown to be reasonably 
successful at dealing with the effects of clutter. Further work remains to form a more general 
template library, specifically with incorporating the clutter thickness, explosive volume, and 
target distance into templates. However, a process to keep the number of templates finite has 
been demonstrated.  While neutron interrogation may be coupled with X-ray or trace methods, it 
has been found to be capable of explosive-inert differentiation independently. This is because 
neutrons are penetrating and can identify targets by their stoichiometry, while X-ray and trace 
detection methods fail to do so as effectively. 
In conclusion, SBRS using neutron interrogation merits attention and has advantages over 
present X-ray or trace detection methods particularly with detection of explosives in large 
volume targets. Simulations have demonstrated that SBRS technology can be used to 
differentiate fixed-geometry targets containing a one-gallon IED (RDX) shielded by 10 cm of 
clutter at distance of at least 1 m with good sensitivity and specificity. This was accomplished for 
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an extensive variety of common material compositions used for clutter and inert materials. In 
section, 5.4.2, RDX was differentiated in all examined cases with only 2 false positives.  
6.2 Build a Field Prototype to Experimentally Verify Results 
Currently, work with SBRS involves building an experimental laboratory prototype to 
conduct field tests. The experimental prototype will involve a 14.1-MeV D-T neutron generator, 
a two-dimensional translation target stage and many types of targets. Experimental research 
should be performed to confirm the conclusions reached by simulations. Specifically, the tiered 
filter approach should be implemented experimentally to test its validity. A photon interrogation 
source and neutron counters may be added to assist interrogation. Scanning of targets should be 
tested with an experimental system to determine the time required for SBRS to identify IEDs. 
Finally, the technology must be streamlined and shielding materials reduced in preparation for 
field or checkpoint implementation. Ideally, SBRS will eventually become portable or truck 
mounted. 
6.3 Further Refinements to the Template Matching Method 
An experimental template library should be created. Additionally, the tiered filter 
approach should be tried with combinations of inert clutter materials. Characteristics including 
clutter thickness, target distance and explosive volume should be incorporated into the tiered 
filter approach. It may be possible to manage clutter thickness by adding another tier in the 
approach shown in section 5.4.2, but this must be shown. Variable target distances and explosive 
volumes might be accounted for by using the scaling factor β already contained within the 
figure-of-merit approach to create another tier. Templates may be generated for discrete 
distances, and the scaling factor β may be applied to interpolate the response size in between 
distances. This may be accomplished by using a rangefinder coupled with control software. Also, 
the method described in section 5.4.2 should be programmed as an algorithm in control software, 
to make the process automated. Ultimately, SBRS has been shown in simulations to be capable 
of differentiating explosive targets with good sensitivity and good specificity, but requires 
further development to effectively implement in a field environment.   
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Appendix A - Simulated Dose Rates 
Table A.1 Ambient dose equivalent rates (mrem hr -1) averaged over a 10 cm radius 
circular area on roof/floor on yz-plane at x = 60 cm (~above collimator). 
Position Neutron σ Photon σ 
A 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.19 
B 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.19 
C 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.12 
D N/A N/A N/A N/A 
E N/A N/A N/A N/A 
F 1.05 0.05 0.32 0.03 
G 0.35 0.07 0.09 0.04 
H 0.34 0.08 0.15 0.04 
I 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.07 
J 0.30 0.08 0.15 0.04 
K 0.34 0.09 0.17 0.05 
L 0.49 0.07 0.04 0.05 
M 0.54 0.07 0.04 0.06 
N 0.59 0.06 0.05 0.05 
O 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.12 
P 0.02 0.19 0.00 0.15 
Q 1.79 0.04 0.41 0.03 
R 3.66 0.03 0.74 0.02 
S 0.88 0.06 0.21 0.03 
T 0.83 0.05 0.19 0.03 
U 0.86 0.06 0.22 0.04 
V 0.89 0.06 0.22 0.04 
W N/A N/A N/A N/A 
X N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Y 1.56 0.05 0.12 0.04 
Z 1.93 0.04 0.14 0.05 
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Table A.2 Ambient dose equivalent rates (mrem hr -1) averaged over a 10 cm radius 
circular area on walls on xy-plane at z = -20.32 cm (source elevation). 
Position Neutron σ Photon σ 
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
B 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.83 
C 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.76 
D 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.45 
E 0.02 0.30 0.00 0.27 
F 0.01 0.33 0.00 0.38 
G 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.44 
H 0.01 0.38 0.00 0.47 
I 0.16 0.08 0.01 0.09 
J 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.10 
K 0.05 0.20 0.00 0.20 
L 0.02 0.21 0.00 0.23 
M 0.01 0.23 0.00 0.31 
N 0.01 0.35 0.00 0.39 
O 0.04 0.16 0.00 0.18 
P 0.04 0.16 0.00 0.19 
Q 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.17 
R 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.16 
S 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.17 
T 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.20 
U 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.17 
V 0.07 0.22 0.00 0.21 
W 1.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
X 0.40 0.06 0.02 0.07 
Y 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.15 
Z 0.05 0.17 0.00 0.17 
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Table A.3 Ambient dose equivalent rates (mrem hr -1) averaged over a 10 cm radius 
circular area on walls on xy-plane at z = -20.32 cm (source elevation). 
Position Neutron σ Photon σ 
a 0.04 0.48 0.01 0.08 
b 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.08 
c 0.04 0.17 0.01 0.09 
d 0.04 0.18 0.01 0.15 
e 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.11 
f 0.01 0.42 0.00 0.21 
g 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.30 
h 0.01 0.37 0.00 0.40 
i 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.50 
j 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.52 
k 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.62 
l 1.08 0.04 0.26 0.02 
m 3.44 0.02 0.73 0.01 
n 9.04 0.03 0.57 0.02 
o 13.66 0.04 0.40 0.03 
p 1.30 0.05 0.11 0.03 
q 0.77 0.05 0.07 0.04 
r 0.58 0.06 0.05 0.04 
s 0.45 0.07 0.04 0.05 
t 0.40 0.08 0.03 0.06 
u 0.31 0.07 0.03 0.08 
v 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table A.4 Ambient dose equivalent rates (mrem hr -1) averaged over a 10 cm radius 
circular area on walls on xy-plane at z = -20.32 cm (source elevation). 
Position Neutron σ Photon σ 
aa 9.59 0.02 2.57 0.01 
bb 33.01 0.01 7.49 0.01 
cc 83.81 0.03 5.90 0.02 
dd 84.91 0.04 2.64 0.02 
ee 16.01 0.04 1.60 0.02 
ff 9.61 0.05 1.22 0.02 
gg 6.89 0.05 1.05 0.03 
hh 5.44 0.06 0.82 0.03 
ii 5.00 0.06 0.75 0.04 
jj 2.40 0.08 0.40 0.06 
kk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ll 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.05 
mm 0.20 0.09 0.06 0.04 
nn 0.28 0.09 0.08 0.05 
oo 0.23 0.08 0.06 0.04 
pp 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.05 
qq 0.17 0.13 0.04 0.05 
rr 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.06 
ss 0.09 0.14 0.03 0.07 
tt 0.10 0.20 0.02 0.08 
uu 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.09 
vv 0.02 0.28 0.01 0.11 
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Table A.5 Neutron dose rate (mrem hr -1) averaged over circular areas as depicted in 
Figure 4.6 with a 10.16x10.16 cm collimation hole at (a) 243.84 cm (8 ft.) and (b) 365.76 cm 
(12 ft.) from the edge of the collimator (elements of matrix: z-dim= columns, y-dim = rows). 
(a) 
D. Rate σ D. Rate σ D. Rate σ D. Rate σ D. Rate σ 
36.00 0.42 49.85 0.56 56.31 0.61 49.60 0.57 35.84 0.42
48.96 0.56 113.00 3.47 240.52 17.46 117.72 5.07 49.32 0.56
55.56 0.61 235.10 15.07 10007.20 237.17 229.57 15.43 55.56 0.61
49.45 0.56 116.47 5.24 247.56 17.58 112.15 3.36 49.41 0.56
35.90 0.42 49.62 0.56 56.37 0.61 49.57 0.56 35.55 0.43
 
(b) 
D. Rate σ D. Rate σ D. Rate σ D. Rate σ D. Rate σ 
29.11 0.44 41.88 0.85 50.57 0.98 44.28 0.90 30.09 0.49
42.95 0.82 118.07 11.49 226.71 20.61 134.22 13.61 42.37 0.82
51.58 1.07 231.09 19.16 5793.46 180.18 217.59 18.06 48.85 1.03
42.72 0.80 95.52 6.18 226.95 20.22 109.09 9.55 42.79 0.84
29.55 0.44 43.19 0.83 51.55 1.22 41.73 0.85 29.29 0.44
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Table A.6 Neutron Dose rate (mrem hr -1) averaged over circular areas as depicted in 
Figure 4.6 with a 5.08x5.08 cm collimation hole at (a) 243.84 cm (8 ft.) and (b) 365.76 cm 
(12 ft.) from the edge of the collimator (elements of matrix: z-dim= columns, y-dim = rows). 
(a) 
D. Rate σ D. Rate σ D. Rate σ D. Rate σ D. Rate σ 
6.65 0.17 9.07 0.24 9.51 0.24 8.95 0.23 6.94 0.19
8.88 0.23 13.92 0.33 18.88 0.44 13.59 0.33 8.73 0.23
9.47 0.24 18.42 0.41 6853.15 192.57 19.14 0.47 9.59 0.24
8.91 0.23 14.06 0.33 18.53 0.41 13.53 0.32 8.79 0.23
6.81 0.18 8.71 0.22 9.72 0.25 8.83 0.23 6.87 0.18
 
(b) 
D. Rate σ D. Rate σ D. Rate σ D. Rate σ D. Rate σ 
4.94 0.15 5.98 0.18 6.42 0.19 5.79 0.17 4.87 0.15
5.93 0.17 10.02 0.34 18.42 2.25 9.94 0.33 5.99 0.18
6.54 0.20 20.19 2.29 5505.15 175.61 20.02 2.31 6.55 0.19
6.08 0.18 9.82 0.30 15.29 0.93 9.64 0.28 5.94 0.18
4.85 0.15 5.99 0.18 6.24 0.18 5.79 0.17 4.93 0.16
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Appendix B - Interference Gamma Rays 
Table B.1  Results showing the number of peaks in 4-keV wide bins exceeding 2σ of the 
count continuum from a pulse height tally for elements with Z =1 - 12. 
Element Energy (MeV) H Li Be B C N O F Na Mg 
H 2.22324 1          
C 1.26176        1   
C 3.68392      1 1    
C 4.439     1 1 1    
C 4.9453           
N 0.72836      1     
N 1.6353  1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 
N 1.88482           
N 2.3128      1     
N 2.7931      1     
N 3.3786    1  1     
N 3.8907      1     
N 4.9151      1     
N 5.1059      1     
N 5.2692           
N 6.4462      1 1    
N 7.0291      1     
N 10.8291           
O 0.87071           
O 1.08793  1    1     
O 2.18448           
O 2.742       1    
O 6.1299       1    
O 6.9171       1    
O 7.1168       1    
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Table B.2  Results showing the number of peaks in 4-keV wide bins exceeding 2σ of the 
count continuum from a pulse height tally for elements with Z =13 - 22. 
Element Energy (MeV) Al Si P S Cl K Ca Sc Ti 
H 2.22324          
C 1.26176          
C 3.68392          
C 4.439          
C 4.9453          
N 0.72836          
N 1.6353 1 1  1 1 1  1 1 
N 1.88482          
N 2.3128          
N 2.7931          
N 3.3786          
N 3.8907         1 
N 4.9151          
N 5.1059          
N 5.2692          
N 6.4462          
N 7.0291          
N 10.8291          
O 0.87071 1         
O 1.08793      1    
O 2.18448  1    1    
O 2.742          
O 6.1299          
O 6.9171  1        
O 7.1168          
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Table B.3  Results showing the number of peaks in 4-keV wide bins exceeding 2σ of the 
count continuum from a pulse height tally for elements with Z =23 - 30. 
Element Energy (MeV) V Cr Mn Fe Co Ni Cu Zn 
H 2.22324         
C 1.26176         
C 3.68392         
C 4.439         
C 4.9453         
N 0.72836   1      
N 1.6353 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 
N 1.88482   1      
N 2.3128         
N 2.7931       1  
N 3.3786         
N 3.8907         
N 4.9151         
N 5.1059         
N 5.2692  1       
N 6.4462         
N 7.0291         
N 10.8291         
O 0.87071         
O 1.08793         
O 2.18448         
O 2.742         
O 6.1299         
O 6.9171         
O 7.1168         
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Appendix C - Simulated Materials 
Table C.1 Inert material compositions used in simulations (Williams III, 2006). 
Material Density  
(g cm-3) 
Element ZAID Atomic Fraction 
(or weight percent 
indicated by a – sign) 
Air  0.001205 C 6012 0.000151 
  N 7014 0.784437 
  O  8016 0.210750 
  Ar 18000 0.004671 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Aluminum 2.70 Al 13027 1.000000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Antifreeze  1.1132 H 1001 0.60 
(Ethylene Glycol)  C 6012 0.20 
  O 8016 0.20 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Ash (General Wood) 0.641 C 6000 0.13 
  O 8016 0.42 
  Mg 12000 0.01 
  Al 13027 0.02 
  K 19000 0.08 
  Ca 20000 0.34 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Borax 1.73 H 1001 0.465118 
  B-10 5010 0.018600 
  B-11 5011 0.074423 
  O 8016 0.395346 
  Na 11023 0.046511 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Bricks 1.80 O  8016 0.663062 
  Al 13027 0.003916 
  Si 14000 0.323140 
  Ca 20000 0.007272 
  Fe 26000 0.002610 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Carbon (Graphite) 1.70 C 6012 1.000000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Cardboard 0.689 H 1001 0.4762 
  C 6000 0.2857 
  O 8016 0.2381 
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Table C.2 Inert material compositions used in simulations (Williams III, 2006). 
Material Density  
(g cm-3) 
Element ZAID Atomic Fraction 
(or weight percent 
indicated by a – sign) 
Ceramic 2.403 O 8016 0.6364 
  Al 13027 0.1818 
  Si 14000 0.1818 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Cherry Wood 0.43 H 1001 0.476191 
  C 6012 0.285714 
  O 8016 0.238095 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Concrete 2.35 H  1001 -0.0056 
  O  8016 -0.4983 
  Na 11023 -0.0171 
  Mg 12000 -0.0024 
  Al 13027 -0.0456 
  Si 14000 -0.3158 
  S 16032 -0.0012 
  K 19000 -0.0192 
  Ca 20000 -0.0826 
  Fe 26000 -0.0122 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Copper 8.920 Cu 29000 1.000000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Cotton 1.55 H 1001 0.4762 
  C 6000 0.2857 
  O 8016 0.2381 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Cyanurate (Polyiso) 0.0321 H 1001 0.34500 
  C 6012 0.51700 
  N 7014 0.06900 
  O 8016 0.06900 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Ethanol 0.80 H 1001 0.66667 
  C 6012 0.22222 
  O 8016 0.11111 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
FertA (nitrogenous) 0.81 H  1001 -0.0300 
  C  6012 -0.2500 
  N  7014 -0.3600 
  O  8016 -0.3460 
  S 16000 -0.0140 
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Table C.3 Inert material compositions used in simulations (Williams III, 2006). 
Material Density  
(g cm-3) 
Element ZAID Atomic Fraction 
(or weight percent 
indicated by a – sign) 
FertB(non-nitrogenous) 0.99 H   1001 0.001848 
  O   8016 0.001657 
  Na 11023 0.014039 
  Mg 12000 0.000313 
  S  16000 0.000183 
  Cl 17000 0.497978 
  K  19000 0.483587 
  Ca 20000 0.000254 
  Br 35079 0.000153 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Gasoline 0.68 H  1001 0.694164 
  C  6012 0.305836 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Glass 2.40 O  8016 0.603858 
  Na 11023 0.088145 
  Si 14028 0.251791 
  Ca 20000 0.056205 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Granite 2.73 H   1001 0.027122 
  C   6012 0.000502 
  O   8016 0.607735 
  Na 11023 0.025866 
  Mg 12000 0.018081 
  Al 13027 0.062783 
  Si 14000 0.205927 
  K  19000 0.013938 
  Ca 20000 0.018960 
  Fe 26000 0.019086 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Herbicide 1 1.17 H 1001 0.487179 
  C 6000 0.333333 
  N 7014 0.076924 
  O 8016 0.102564 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Herbicide 2 1.25 H 1001 0.46666 
  C 6012 0.40000 
  N 7014 0.06667 
  Cl 17000 0.06667 
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Table C.4 Inert material compositions used in simulations (Williams III, 2006). 
Material Density  
(g cm-3) 
Element ZAID Atomic Fraction 
(or weight percent 
indicated by a – sign) 
Herbicide 3 1.187 H 1001 0.50000 
  C 6012 0.28572 
  N 7014 0.17857 
  Cl 17000 0.03571 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Lead 11.35 Pb 82000 1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Limestone 2.35 C 6000 0.2 
  O 8016 0.6 
  Ca 20000 0.2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Lucite 1.19 H 1001 0.53332 
  C 6000 0.33335 
  O 8016 0.13333 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Nickel 8.9 Ni 28000 1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Nylon 1.14 H 1001 0.578932 
  C 6012 0.315803 
  N 7014 0.052632 
  O 8016 0.052633 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Petroleum 0.97 H  1001 0.620069 
  C  6012 0.368589 
  N  7014 0.003904 
  O  8016 0.002523 
  S 16000 0.004913 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Plexiglass 1.19 H 1001 0.533320 
  C 6012 0.333345 
  O 8016 0.133335 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Polyethylene 0.93 H 1001 0.666662 
  C 6012 0.333338 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Polystyrene 0.10 H 1001 0.49999 
  C 6012 0.50001 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Polyurethane (Foam) 0.10 H 1001 0.360023 
  C 6012 0.400878 
  N 7014 0.076459 
  O 8016 0.162639 
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Table C.5 Inert material compositions used in simulations (Williams III, 2006). 
Material Density  
(g cm-3) 
Element ZAID Atomic Fraction 
(or weight percent 
indicated by a – sign) 
Potassium Hydroxide 2.044 H 1001 0.33333 
  O 8016 0.33333 
  K 19000 0.33331 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Propane 0.0019 H 1001 0.72726 
  C 6012 0.27274 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Rubber 0.92 H 1001 0.615370 
  C 6012 0.384630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Salt 2.18 Na 11023 0.500000 
  Cl 17000 0.500000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Soap 0.801 H 1001 0.614 
  C 6000 0.318 
  O 8016 0.045 
  Na 11023 0.023 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Soil 1.61 H  1001 -0.02331 
  O  8016 -0.55922 
  Si 14000 -0.22259 
  Al 13027 -0.06528 
  Fe 26000 -0.04015 
  Ca 20000 -0.02915 
  K 19000 -0.02080 
  Na 11023 -0.02272 
  Mg 12000 -0.01678 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Soy 0.72 H 1001 0.6127 
  C 6012 0.3295 
  O 8016 0.0578 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Steel 7.85 C  6012 -0.0015 
  N  7014 -0.0025 
  Si 14000 -0.0075 
  Cr 24000 -0.1600 
  Mn 25055 -0.0500 
  Fe 26000 -0.7385 
  Ni 28000 -0.0400 
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Table C.6 Inert material compositions used in simulations (Williams III, 2006). 
Material Density  
(g cm-3) 
Element ZAID Atomic Fraction 
(or weight percent 
indicated by a – sign) 
Styrofoam 1.06 H 1001 0.49994 
  C 6012 0.50006 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sugar 1.54 H 1001 0.50 
  C 6012 0.25 
  O 8016 0.25 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Tissue 1.04 H 1001 0.10117 
  C 6012 0.11100 
  N 7014 0.02600 
  O 8016 0.76183 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Titanium 4.54 Ti 22000 1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Water 1.00 H 10001 0.666657 
  O 8016 0.333343 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wax 0.93 H 1001 0.675311 
  C 6012 0.324689 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wood 0.75 H 1001 0.4762 
  C 6012 0.2857 
  O 8016 0.2381 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Zirconium 6.506 Zr 40000  
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Table C.7 Explosive compositions used in simulations (National Research Council, 2004). 
Material Density (g cm-3) Element ZAID Weight Percent 
Ammonium nitrate (AN) 1.70 H 1001 0.0504 
H4N2O3  C 6012 0 
  N 7014 0.3501 
  O 8016 0.5997 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Ammonium picrate (Expl D) 1.72 H 1001 0.0246 
C6H6N4O7  C 6012 0.2928 
  N 7014 0.2276 
  O 8016 0.4550 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Cyclonite (RDX) 1.80 H 1001 0.0272 
C3H6N6O6  C 6012 0.1622 
  N 7014 0.3784 
  O 8016 0.4322 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Guanidine nitrate 1.436 H 1001 0.0495 
CH6N4O3  C 6012 0.0984 
  N 7014 0.4589 
  O 8016 0.3932 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
HMTD 0.88 H 1001 0.0581 
C6H12N2O6  C 6012 0.3462 
  N 7014 0.1346 
  O 8016 0.4611 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
HNIW 1.98 H 1001 0.0138 
C6H6N12O12  C 6012 0.1645 
  N 7014 0.3836 
  O 8016 0.4382 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hydrazine nitrate (HN) 1.20 H 1001 0.0530 
H5N3O3  C 6012 0 
  N 7014 0.4420 
  O 8016 0.5009 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Nitroglycerin (NG) 1.60 H 1001 0.0222 
C3H5N3O9  C 6012 0.1587 
  N 7014 0.1850 
  O 8016 0.6341 
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Table C.8 Explosive compositions used in simulations (National Research Council, 2004). 
Material Density (g cm-3) Element ZAID Weight Percent 
Nitrotriazolone (NTO) 1.88 H 1001 0.0155 
C2H2N4O3  C 6012 0.1847 
  N 7014 0.4308 
  O 8016 0.3690 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Octogen (HMX) 1.90 H 1001 0.0272 
C4H8N8O8  C 6012 0.1622 
  N 7014 0.3784 
  O 8016 0.4322 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Pentaerythritol tetranitrate  1.77 H 1001 0.0255 
(PETN)  C 6012 0.1900 
C5H8N4O12  N 7014 0.1772 
  O 8016 0.6073 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Picric acid 1.80 H 1001 0.0132 
C6H3N3O7  C 6012 0.3146 
  N 7014 0.1834 
  O 8016 0.4888 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Tetrazene  0.45 H 1001 0.0429 
C2H8N10O  C 6012 0.1277 
  N 7014 0.7444 
  O 8016 0.0850 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Tetryl 1.57 H 1001 0.0176 
C7H5N5O8  C 6012 0.2928 
  N 7014 0.2439 
  O 8016 0.4458 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Trinitrobenzene (TNB) 1.64 H 1001 0.0142 
C6H3N3O6  C 6012 0.3382 
  N 7014 0.1972 
  O 8016 0.4505 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Trinitrotoluene (TNT) 1.65 H 1001 0.0222 
C7H5N3O6  C 6012 0.3702 
  N 7014 0.1850 
  O 8016 0.4226 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Triaminoguanidine nitrate  1.54 H 1001 0.0543 
(TAGN)  C 6012 0.0719 
CH9N7O3  N 7014 0.5867 
  O 8016 0.2872 
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Table C.9 Explosive compositions used in simulations (National Research Council, 2004). 
Material Density (g cm-3) Element ZAID Weight Percent 
Triaminotrinitrobenzene 1.93 H 1001 0.0234 
(TATB)  C 6012 0.2792 
C6H6N6O6  N 7014 0.3255 
  O 8016 0.3719 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
1,3,3-Trinitroazetidine (TNAZ) 1.85 H 1001 0.0210 
C3H4N4O6  C 6012 0.1876 
  N 7014 0.2917 
  O 8016 0.4998 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Trinitropyridine 1.86 H 1001 0.0094 
C5H2N4O6  C 6012 0.2805 
  N 7014 0.2617 
  O 8016 0.4484 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Urea nitrate 0.69 H 1001 0.0409 
CH5N3O4  C 6012 0.0976 
  N 7014 0.3414 
  O 8016 0.5200 
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Appendix D - Signature Energies Used in Experiments 
Table D.1  11 Signature energies used in sections 5.3.1, 252Cf explosive-inert experiments, 
and 5.3.2, 14.1-MeV explosive-inert experiments. 
Element Signature Energy (MeV) 
Hydrogen 2.2232 
Carbon 1.2618 
4.4390 
4.9453 
Nitrogen 1.6353 
1.8848 
2.3128 
5.1059 
Oxygen 0.8707 
 2.1845 
6.1299 
 
 
Table D.2  20 Signature energies used in section 5.3.3 for placement of the sample.  
Element Signature Energy (MeV) 
Hydrogen 2.2232 
Carbon 1.2618 
 4.4390 
 4.9453 
Nitrogen 1.6353 
 1.8848 
 2.3128 
 3.6839 
 3.3786 
 3.8907 
 100
 4.9151 
 5.1059 
 5.2692 
 6.4462 
 10.8291 
Oxygen  0.8707 
 2.1845 
 6.1299 
 6.9171 
 7.1168 
 
 
Table D.3  Nitrogen signature energies used in section 5.4.1, grouping by density. 
Element Signature Energy (MeV) 
Nitrogen 2.3128 
 3.3786 
 4.9151 
 5.1059 
 6.4462 
 
Table D.4  Signature energies used in section 5.4.2, a tiered filter approach. 
Element Signature Energy (MeV) 
Hydrogen 2.2232 
Carbon 4.4390 
Nitrogen 2.3128 
 3.3786 
 4.9151 
 5.1059 
 6.4462 
Oxygen 6.1299 
       6.9171 
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Appendix E - Four Templates and Fifty Target Responses and 
Standard Deviations Used in Section 5.4.1, Grouping Clutter by 
Density, to Calculate FOMs and their Standard Deviations and f±(1) 
Values. 
Table E.1  VLD, LD, MD and HD templates.  
 i Ei 
(MeV) 
VLD LD MD HD 
S1 1 2.3128 15301.55 9492.46 7078.31 3192.66 
σ(S1)   41.31 31.87 28.05 20.92 
S2 2 3.3786 3008.22 1839.75 1487.90 842.42 
σ(S2)   19.40 15.46 14.99 13.03 
S3 3 4.9151 2436.34 1428.65 1173.91 580.34 
σ(S3)   16.69 12.56 11.86 9.45 
S4 4 5.1059 10402.65 6370.55 4864.00 1996.40 
σ(S4)   35.88 27.20 24.35 16.64 
S5 5 6.4462 2457.02 1538.74 1158.26 524.44 
σ(S5)   17.69 13.73 12.35 8.76 
 
Table E.2  Responses and standard deviations for RDX with clutter materials shown. 
 i Ei 
(MeV) 
Air Aluminum Bricks Carbon Concrete 
R1 1 2.3128 15490.30 6708.81 8015.11 7095.06 6432.09 
σ(R1)   41.82 27.51 29.66 27.67 27.02 
R2 2 3.3786 3049.51 1498.23 1653.07 1431.43 1347.58 
σ(R2)   19.52 17.08 15.37 14.60 14.28 
R3 3 4.9151 2479.78 1175.50 1333.19 1101.51 1067.93 
σ(R3)   16.86 12.23 12.93 10.91 11.32 
R4 4 5.1059 10526.30 4582.70 5732.37 4730.81 4553.89 
σ(R4)   35.79 23.83 26.37 23.65 23.23 
R5 5 6.4462 2474.17 1136.43 1341.17 1114.32 1088.02 
σ(R5)   17.81 11.71 13.55 11.92 12.95 
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Table E.3 Responses and standard deviations for RDX with clutter materials shown. 
 i Ei 
(MeV) 
Copper Ethanol FertA FertB Gasoline 
R1 1 2.3128 2972.00 8437.61 19124.40 11897.00 8760.83 
σ(R1)   21.70 30.38 47.81 35.69 30.66 
R2 2 3.3786 801.99 1637.55 3667.87 2461.08 1698.42 
σ(R2)   13.96 14.90 21.64 17.72 15.46 
R3 3 4.9151 522.37 1286.68 2620.09 1952.86 1336.05 
σ(R3)   9.51 11.97 17.82 15.04 12.02 
R4 4 5.1059 1775.45 5503.64 13945.50 8043.89 5718.43 
σ(R4)   16.87 25.87 41.84 30.57 26.31 
R5 5 6.4462 462.80 1298.49 3628.48 1902.17 1359.11 
σ(R5)   9.07 12.60 22.13 15.22 13.18 
 
Table E.4  Responses and standard deviations for RDX with clutter materials shown. 
 i Ei 
(MeV) 
Glass Granite Nylon Petroleum Plexiglass 
R1 1 2.3128 6615.71 5897.31 10661.40 7858.39 7231.48 
σ(R1)   27.12 25.95 34.12 29.08 28.20 
R2 2 3.3786 1357.44 1256.06 2009.89 1524.05 1399.92 
σ(R2)   14.12 13.94 16.28 14.33 14.00 
R3 3 4.9151 1113.50 989.28 1493.23 1190.47 1115.83 
σ(R3)   11.69 11.28 12.84 11.43 11.05 
R4 4 5.1059 4400.98 4153.49 7464.47 5146.46 4710.16 
σ(R4)   23.77 22.84 29.86 24.70 23.55 
R5 5 6.4462 1060.85 947.95 1855.16 1229.28 1107.66 
σ(R5)   12.09 11.38 15.58 12.29 11.74 
 
Table E.5 Responses and standard deviations for RDX with clutter materials shown. 
 i Ei 
(MeV) 
Poly-
ethylene 
Poly-
urethane 
Rubber Salt Soil 
R1 1 2.3128 7365.98 15112.80 7860.44 8070.17 7792.18 
σ(R1)   27.99 40.81 29.08 29.86 29.61 
R2 2 3.3786 1414.44 2966.93 1508.74 1768.32 1591.04 
σ(R2)   13.86 19.29 14.18 15.38 15.12 
R3 3 4.9151 1120.64 2392.90 1195.66 1349.40 1260.93 
σ(R3)   11.21 16.51 11.60 12.28 12.23 
R4 4 5.1059 4770.83 10279.00 5109.05 5433.35 5324.44 
σ(R4)   23.85 35.98 24.52 25.54 25.56 
R5 5 6.4462 1125.86 2439.87 1209.53 1311.92 1265.46 
σ(R5)   11.82 17.57 12.22 12.46 12.78 
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Table E.6 Responses and standard deviations for RDX with clutter materials shown. 
 i Ei 
(MeV) 
Soy Steel Water Wax Wood 
R1 1 2.3128 9250.55 3413.32 7735.64 7284.02 9934.29 
σ(R1)   31.45 20.14 29.40 27.68 32.78 
R2 2 3.3786 1782.14 882.85 1493.47 1393.26 1925.98 
σ(R2)   15.15 12.10 14.49 13.52 15.41 
R3 3 4.9151 1413.96 638.32 1192.03 1108.22 1546.76 
σ(R3)   12.44 9.38 11.80 10.97 13.15 
R4 4 5.1059 6067.95 2217.35 5016.39 4715.92 6604.44 
σ(R4)   26.70 16.41 24.58 23.58 27.74 
R5 5 6.4462 1437.99 586.08 1179.90 1114.22 1555.82 
σ(R5)   13.66 8.44 12.15 11.70 14.16 
 
Table E.7  Responses and standard deviations for inert materials shown used as the clutter 
and the sample.  
 i Ei 
(MeV) 
Air Aluminum Bricks Carbon Concrete 
R1 1 2.3128 173.68 530.73 353.55 120.91 350.56 
σ(R1)   5.92 12.58 10.82 6.88 10.17 
R2 2 3.3786 113.28 410.54 253.17 116.66 263.35 
σ(R2)   5.02 13.59 8.94 8.38 10.53 
R3 3 4.9151 52.77 226.52 149.40 18.99 128.37 
σ(R3)   3.39 6.80 8.08 1.88 6.43 
R4 4 5.1059 112.30 361.99 749.24 23.51 555.84 
σ(R4)   5.73 8.36 11.76 2.11 9.34 
R5 5 6.4462 36.65 216.86 192.15 15.97 162.19 
σ(R5)   2.53 6.16 6.71 1.71 6.65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104
Table E.8 Responses and standard deviations for inert materials shown used as the clutter 
and the sample. 
 i Ei 
(MeV) 
Copper Ethanol FertA FertB Gasoline 
R1 1 2.3128 700.94 72.58 15652.90 489.20 81.15 
σ(R1)   17.52 5.17 43.83 10.27 5.67 
R2 2 3.3786 431.85 82.82 3027.56 378.79 72.67 
σ(R2)   13.99 6.07 20.29 8.64 5.03 
R3 3 4.9151 165.68 26.50 1776.74 178.36 21.54 
σ(R3)   7.72 3.77 14.93 5.82 2.10 
R4 4 5.1059 192.30 30.09 12361.00 168.09 28.70 
σ(R4)   8.58 3.03 40.79 5.87 2.34 
R5 5 6.4462 95.10 15.41 3461.42 84.35 14.78 
σ(R5)   4.18 1.87 22.15 4.73 1.69 
 
Table E.9  Responses and standard deviations for inert materials shown used as the clutter 
and the sample. 
 i Ei 
(MeV) 
Glass Granite Nylon Petroleum Plexiglass 
R1 1 2.3128 438.82 415.83 5548.10 495.11 94.63 
σ(R1)   11.23 11.81 25.52 8.76 6.18 
R2 2 3.3786 248.36 270.55 1042.43 151.85 87.12 
σ(R2)   9.41 9.23 12.41 6.09 6.80 
R3 3 4.9151 161.24 142.70 638.28 72.03 22.80 
σ(R3)   7.11 7.38 8.55 3.39 2.75 
R4 4 5.1059 170.87 524.38 4272.08 363.81 27.83 
σ(R4)   8.30 9.49 23.07 6.99 3.02 
R5 5 6.4462 103.50 104.71 1155.91 112.25 13.34 
σ(R5)   6.25 5.96 12.60 3.99 1.60 
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Table E.10 Responses and standard deviations for inert materials shown used as the clutter 
and the sample. 
 i Ei 
(MeV) 
Poly-
ethylene 
Poly-
urethane 
Rubber Salt Soil 
R1 1 2.3128 68.98 1047.95 74.18 619.31 300.01 
σ(R1)   4.99 13.00 5.02 11.09 10.14 
R2 2 3.3786 69.46 278.96 69.42 462.23 241.38 
σ(R2)   5.49 7.31 5.03 10.03 9.20 
R3 3 4.9151 17.70 145.65 21.68 197.78 105.02 
σ(R3)   1.88 4.78 2.79 6.59 6.69 
R4 4 5.1059 26.73 808.34 27.51 257.70 392.04 
σ(R4)   2.60 11.88 2.26 6.83 8.90 
R5 5 6.4462 15.33 232.15 17.84 155.55 122.81 
σ(R5)   2.26 6.06 3.39 4.42 5.27 
 
Table E.11 Responses and standard deviations for inert materials shown used as the clutter 
and the sample. 
 i Ei 
(MeV) 
Soy Steel Water Wax Wood 
R1 1 2.3128 85.51 552.66 108.73 68.27 98.39 
σ(R1)   6.12 11.39 7.24 4.97 6.58 
R2 2 3.3786 76.74 397.86 89.91 64.59 86.21 
σ(R2)   5.43 9.27 7.27 5.16 6.04 
R3 3 4.9151 27.11 191.76 30.94 18.47 29.22 
σ(R3)   2.74 6.14 4.29 1.90 3.25 
R4 4 5.1059 28.80 265.75 34.78 27.19 31.12 
σ(R4)   2.33 6.80 4.03 2.60 2.94 
R5 5 6.4462 18.27 157.09 16.74 13.98 19.13 
σ(R5)   3.02 5.09 3.23 1.64 2.78 
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Appendix F - Additional Figures 
 
Figure F.1 Simulated pulse height tally spectrum for a sample containing pure C irradiated 
by 14.1-MeV neutrons. 
 
Figure F.2 Simulated pulse height tally spectrum for a sample containing pure H irradiated 
by 14.1-MeV neutrons. 
 107
  
Figure F.3 Simulated pulse height tally spectrum for a sample containing pure O irradiated 
by 14.1-MeV neutrons. 
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Appendix G - Sample MCNP5 Input File and Perl Script 
Table G.1  A typical MCNP input file. 
Explosive Target Interrogation 
C ************ BLOCK 1 -- CELLS  ********************************  
1   2  -1.80  -15                     imp:p,n=1   
2   1  -7.82   15 -16               imp:n,p=1   
3   0              16 -20               imp:n,p=1   
4   3  -2.7      20 -21               imp:n,p=1   
5   0              21   -999           imp:n,p=1   
6   6  -1        -30                     imp:n,p=1   
13  0         999                       imp:n,p=0   
 
C ************ BLOCK 2 -- SURFACES *****************************  
15  RCC  0 0 39.624  0 0 20.7517  7.62             
16  RCC  0 0 39.504  0 0 20.9917  7.74             
20  RPP  -100   100    -50   50   0   100          
21  RPP  -100.2 100.2  -50.2 50.2 -0.2 100.2       
30  RPP  -98 98   -49.95 -39.95   2  98         
999  SO   500.0                                    
 
C ************ BLOCK 3 -- COMMANDS *****************************  
mode n p  
NPS 50000000  
c  
c ------ SOURCE: plane parallel cylindrical neutron beam  
SDEF  POS= 0 -150 50  
      AXS= 0 1 0  
      EXT= 0  
      RAD= d1   
      PAR= 1  
      VEC= 0 1 0  
      DIR= 1  
      ERG= 14.1      
SI1  0  7.62         
SP1  -21  1          
c  
F15:p     
         121.92 -100 50 10    
c      Energy Bins:  
E15  0. 0.8687 0.8727 1.2598 1.2638   
         1.6333 1.6373  2.2212 2.2252    
         2.3108 2.3148  3.3766 3.3806   
         3.8887 3.8927  4.4370 4.4410   
         4.9131 4.9171  4.9433 4.9473   
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         5.1039 5.1079  6.1279 6.1319   
         6.4442 6.4482  6.9151 6.9191   
         7.1148 7.1188 10.8271 10.8311  
c  
c ------- MATERIALS:  
c    ********************************************************** 
c     Carbon Steel  
c      Density = 7.82 g cm-3
c    ********************************************************** 
m1    26000.55d  0.95510  
           6000.74c  0.04490  
c  
c *********************************************************** 
c     RDX    (C3H6N6O6)   
c     Density = 1.8 g cm-3                        
c *********************************************************** 
m2        1001.74c -.0272   
             6000.74c -.1622   
             7014.74c -.3784   
             8016.74c -.4322   
c 
c   ********************************************************** 
c      Aluminum    
c      Density = 2.70 g cm-3
c   ********************************************************** 
m3   13027.74c   1.00000  
c    
c ***********************************************************  
c      Artificial Clutter    
c      Density = 1 g cm-3                
c ***********************************************************  
m6        1001.74c  0.85     
             6000.74c  0.05     
             8016.74c  0.10    
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Table G.2  A sample Perl script for MCNP output processing. 
#! /usr/bin/perl 
# the program reads a MCNP output file and copies data to a user inputted output file 
# read in two command line parameters, $ARGV[0]= INFILE name, $ARGV[1]= OUTFILE   
# name. Check for correct number of command line parameters (2), if not print error and die. 
 
if ($#ARGV < 1 || $#ARGV > 1) 
{ 
  print "Incorrect number of command line parameters.\n", 
        "The first parameter should be an input file name.\n", 
        "The second parameter should be an output file name.\n"; 
  die; 
} 
else 
{ 
 print "Input  file name is: $ARGV[0]\n", 
          "Output file name is: $ARGV[1]\n"; 
 
open(INFILE,"<$ARGV[0]"); 
open(OUTFILE,">$ARGV[1]"); 
 
# initializing variables 
$r=1; 
$a=1; 
print OUTFILE $ARGV[0], "\n"; 
# regular expression stores fluence and its standard deviation into an array. 
# The fluence and its standard deviation is scaled by a numerical factor of 1E12 
while($line = <INFILE>) 
{   
   if( $line =~ /^\s*detector\slocated\sat\sx,y,z\s=([\s-]\d\.\d+E[+-]\d+)([\s-]\d\.\d+E[+-              
  ]\d+)(\s\d\.\d+E[+-]\d+)\s*$/)  
    { 
     
     print OUTFILE $r, "\n"; 
     $r++; 
     $j=4; 
         for($i=1;$i<=$j;$i++) 
         { 
           $line = <INFILE>; 
         }   
           
           do  
           { 
             $line =~ /^\s*(\d\.\d+E[+-]\d+)\s+(\d\.\d+E[+-]\d+)\s(\d\.\d+)/; 
              $array1[$a]= $2*1E12; 
              $array2[$a]= $2*$3*1E12; 
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              $a++; 
                 $line = <INFILE>; 
                 $line = <INFILE>;          
            } until  (  $line =~ /^\s+total/ || $line =~ /^ \s*$/ ); 
        }   
} 
 
print OUTFILE "\n"; 
print OUTFILE "\n"; 
   $d=16; 
# printing stored variables in array to output file.   
    for($c=1; $c<=$d; $c++) 
        {  
          print OUTFILE $array1[$c], "\n", sprintf("%.3f",  $array2[$c]), "\n";  
        }                
# Close the file 
close INFILE; 
close OUTFILE; 
}  
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